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Energy field is in transition caused by political interventions and decreasing costs of re-
newable energy and ICT technologies. A new innovation ecosystem is being created
around energy prosumers, new active market players, who produce part of their energy
themselves. Electric vehicles, in-home batteries and ICT-driven business models like ag-
gregation add possibilities to participate in the market. The transition from centralised
energy system to a distributed one creates opportunities but also challenges for policy
makers. Policy interventions are used for different purposes, like environmental targets
but also developing economic competitiveness of the country. Policy instruments form
policy mixes that steer the innovation ecosystem to a certain direction. The EU regulation
creates a framework where countries are specialising in different technologies.
To structure the prosumer-related policy mix and see how they are deployed in practice,
research questions of this thesis are: What policies contribute to energy prosumer ecosys-
tem creation from prosumer’s point of view? How European countries differ in adopting
these policies?
For answering the research question, a cross-country policy comparison was conducted.
Data was gathered from secondary data sources. Countries researched were Finland,
France, Germany, Switzerland and Italy. Policies that were included in scope were chosen
according to an initial review of relevant papers and evaluation of their comparability.
The policies were structured from prosumer’s point of view by using Rogers’ Innovation
Adoption Model. It was based on adoption process of new solar PV system and adding
electric vehicle, demand response or battery to the system.
The results of the cross-country comparison show that the case countries have different
policy mixes related to energy prosuming. Germany supports microgeneration and bat-
teries but lags behind in smart metering. Italy has a developed market for other areas
except aggregation and demand response. Finland has developed good market conditions
but does not incentivise any prosumer technologies. France has centralised energy market
and lacks smart meters but has established regulation for demand response and incentives
for microgeneration and electric vehicles. Switzerland has a dispersed policy landscape
as cantons’ role is emphasised. It is a frontrunner in microgeneration and demand re-
sponse but lags behind in smart metering. From the results, it can be seen that policy
mixes could be further developed in each country to attain the potential prosumer inno-
vation ecosystems have.
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Energia-ala on suuressa murroksessa johtuen eri teknologioiden hintojen laskusta ja po-
liittisista tukitoimista. Pientuottamisen, älymittareiden, kysyntäjouston, sähkön varas-
toinnin ja sähköautojen kautta on syntymässä uudenlainen innovaatioekosysteemi, joka
mahdollistaa kuluttajien osallistumisen sähkömarkkinoille uudella tavalla. Siirtyminen
hajautettuun energiajärjestelmään johtaa lainsäädännön ja politiikan haasteisiin. Poliitti-
silla toimenpiteillä on monia eri päämääriä, kuten ympäristön suojelu ja taloudellinen
kasvu ja kilpailukyky uusilla markkinoilla. Kansantalouden kannalta voi olla viisasta pa-
nostaa kilpailukykyyn strategisilla osa-alueilla, joskin Euroopan unionin säädökset tulee
huomioida eri teknologioiden tukemisessa.
Tämä työ jäsentelee tuottajakuluttajiin liittyviä poliittisia toimenpiteitä ja vastaa seuraa-
viin tutkimuskysymyksiin: Mitkä poliittiset toimenpiteet vaikuttavat tuottajakuluttajiin
keskittyviin innovaatioekosysteemeihin? Miten eri Euroopan maissa näitä on toteutettu?
Työn tutkimusmenetelmänä käytettiin politiikkavertailua, joka suoritettiin sekundääristen
tietolähteiden avulla. Maat, joiden politiikkayhdistelmiä tarkasteltiin, olivat Suomi,
Ranska, Saksa Sveitsi ja Italia. Tarkasteltavat politiikkasäädökset rajattiin tutkimalla,
mitä ajankohtaisia kysymyksiä tuottajakuluttajiin liittyy tällä hetkellä. Lisäksi niiden ver-
tailtavuutta arvioitiin. Säädökset jäsenneltiin tuottajakuluttajan näkökulmasta käyttäen
pohjana Rogersin innovaatioiden adoptointiprosessia. Mallissa kuluttaja ottaa käyttöön
aurinkopaneelijärjestelmän ja liittää siihen kysyntäjouston, sähköauton tai/ja akun.
Työn tulokset osoittavat, miten erilaisia politiikkayhdistelmiä maat ovat implementoi-
neet. Saksa tukee sähkön varastointia, sähköautoja ja pientuottamista, mutta se ei ole tuo-
nut älymittareita tai kysyntäjoustoa kuluttajamarkkinoille. Italia on edelläkävijä muissa
teknologioissa ja ratkaisuissa, mutta sen kysyntäjoustomarkkinoita ollaan vasta luomassa.
Suomi on edelläkävijä kysyntäjoustossa ja älymittaroinnissa mutta pysyttäytynyt mark-
kinaehtoisissa ratkaisuissa teknologioiden edistämisessä. Ranskalla on hyvin säädellyt
kysyntäjoustomarkkinat ja se tukee pientuottamista. Siltä kuitenkin puuttuu vielä älymit-
tarijärjestelmät ja alhaisen sähkönhinnan vuoksi varastointi on kannattamatonta. Sveitsin
kantonijärjestelmä vaikeuttaa kokonaiskuvan luomista, mutta kysyntäjousto ja pientuo-
tanto ovat hyvin säädeltyjä ja tuettuja. Älymittareita Sveitsi ei ole vielä ottanut käyttöön.
Tuloksista voidaan päätellä, että poliittisilla toimenpiteillä painotetaan eri teknologioita
eri maissa. Ekosysteemin kehittämisen kannalta olisi järkevää, että maat täydentäisivät
niiden politiikkayhdistelmiä puuttuvien teknologioiden ja sovellusten kohdilla.
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71. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Energy field is experiencing a big transformation as countries are determined to answer
to the challenge of global warming. The EU (European Union) has a long-term goal of
decreasing its total carbon emissions by 80% by 2050 in comparison to 1990 level
(European Union, 2012). It has made commitments that in 2030 it will increase the share
of renewable energy sources (RES) in its final consumption up to 27% in total. For elec-
tricity sector, this means shares of approximately 50%. The energy sector has traditionally
been included in “network industries” with telecommunication, water and transport
(Daly, 2016). These all have been characterised by natural monopolies that have been
diluting with more liberalised, yet often regulated, competition. Adding distributed en-
ergy resources (DER) in the energy system revolutionises the old top-down structure of
the field and brings different kind of player: “prosumers”, into the value chain
(Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012).
Prosumers were introduced by Alvin Toffler (1981) as customers’ response to industrial-
ised mass markets. Due to increasing resources and needs, customers started to want cus-
tomised and differentiated products. During recent years, prosumption has become again
into scope of research due to new technologies like 3D printing and sharing content on
web (Ellsworth-Krebs & Reid, 2016). In the context of energy, prosuming refers to cus-
tomers who are active in the market by producing, storing and selling energy. By adding
an in-home battery, they can increase their autonomy from the grid but also act as a flex-
ibility  resource  by  providing  grid  services.  Being  active  in  the  market  means  also  co-
creation by which prosumers become important part of the ecosystem development.
Prosumer technologies like solar photovoltaic (PV) and electric vehicles (EVs) have been
developed in politically protected niches until recently. Now they are getting cost com-
petitive and entering to the main stream. They can be seen as disruptive innovations in
relation to the old business models of the energy sector. Utilities are more and more be-
coming big data specialists to enable flexibility and integration of DERs in the grid
(Markard & Erlinghagen, 2012). A whole ecosystem is being built around these technol-
ogies and different companies attain different strategic positions. Aggregators are needed
in handling DERs cost efficiently, solar PV suppliers and installers manage the uptake of
microproduction, and EV manufacturers try to attain value through battery diffusion.
Complementing technologies like smart thermostats, boilers, applications, remote con-
trols and displays offer opportunities for niche players. Business model innovations come
8through new partnerships and acquisitions like in the case of Tesla and SolarCity (Frankel
et al, 2014).
The context of the thesis is shown in figure 1. Because energy prosumer policies bring
vast energy field into residential sector, this thesis takes macro, meso and micro level into
consideration.
Policy approaches
EU regulation
Innovation ecosystem
Prosumer  technology adoption
Policy mix
Macro
Meso
Micro
Figure 1. Context of the thesis (modified from Kotilainen et al., 2016).
The EU regulation affects countries’ policies according to climate targets, economic sit-
uation and other wide socio-technical trends. Political agenda pushes now energy transi-
tion, which means a shift away from fossil fuel usage. Usual framing of energy policies
is the ‘energy trilemma’, meaning that governments have to choose between energy se-
curity, low costs and sustainability. This thesis highlights innovation creation, and there-
fore following policy approaches are handled: industrial policy, environmental policy,
innovation policy and transition policy. These approaches have different objectives and
they frame the policy instruments differently. Chosen policy approaches deal with the
transition in different ways. Transition policies thrive this disruptive socio-technical
change whereas industrial policies enforce the current regime’s position and thrive for
incremental change (Alkemade et al. 2011). Innovation policy aim to create new compe-
tences and networks and environmental policies aim at environmental protection.
Countries have introduced different kinds of incentives for energy prosumers. Policies
depend on policy strategies that countries adopt. Sustainable technologies have potential
of integrating these objectives in policy mixes (Rogge & Rechardt, 2013, p. 19). These
happen in the meso level, which determines the practices and rules regarding the
prosumer ecosystem. The lowest level of the system include the prosumers and how they
react to the policy mixes. In this thesis, the policies are framed as prosumer journey where
different policies affect different steps of technology adoption.
1.2 Research questions
This thesis handles residential prosumers since they are set in the focus of EU’s Energy
Union and reflect well the challenges the energy transition brings along (European
Commission, 2017b, pp. 4-6). For example, prosumers have consumer’s status and need
9different kind of informing and other policies than cooperatives and commercial prosum-
ers who may have professionals taking responsibility. The first objective of this thesis is
to structure policy interventions that affect the development of the energy prosumer eco-
system into a relevant and comprehensive form. The first research questions of this thesis
is:
RQ1: What policies contribute to energy prosumer ecosystem creation from prosumer’s
point of view?
The second objective is to explore, what kind of decisions has been made regarding the
studied public policies. The EU harmonises the regulation and in principle companies act
in one single market. However, in the energy field, the single market is still developing.
Countries may emphasise adoption of different technologies because of different envi-
ronmental reasons and political objectives. This thesis combines also the strategic inno-
vation management aspect into the picture. If the policy targets’ motivations are unclear,
there is a danger of creating needless incentives that could be covered by different, less
costly, policies. On the other hand, if people’s opinions are not taken into consideration
and the technology diffuses quicker than the regulation, there will be a problem of ‘regu-
latory disconnection’ that has appeared strongly in cases of AirBnb and Uber, for example
(Butenko, 2016). The second research question is:
RQ2: How European countries differ in adopting these policies?
These questions are answered by studying policies in Germany, France, Switzerland, Italy
and Finland. This is conducted with a cross-country policy comparison. As the influence
of the EU is important in the energy field, the results also show the approaches the EU
has on the different policies. To emphasise the consumer approach, this thesis uses Rog-
ers’ (2003) Innovation Adoption Model to structure the regulations and incentives that
affect the prosumer. In addition, earlier literature of related to energy prosumers has con-
centrated in separate technologies and their regulations.  This thesis concentrates in the
most common prosumer technology solar PV, but adds enabling technologies like EVs,
storage and DR into the scope. These technologies are interconnected and form the eco-
system of distributed energy resources (DER).
1.3 Structure
The thesis is organised as follows: Second chapter will describe issues in governing in-
novations and innovation ecosystems. It introduces the approaches on which prosumer
policy mixes are being built. The methodology chapter describes the policy scoping pro-
cess and data collection methods. Fourth chapter includes the results and discussion. Dis-
cussion is added to the results because in that way is easier to demonstrate the dynamics
between different policy options. The conclusions chapter will wrap up the results, dis-
cuss the methodology and look forward to next challenges for research.
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2. INNOVATION AND REGULATION
2.1 Factors of innovation diffusion
2.1.1 Incremental and disruptive innovations
“Innovations are processes where new or value adding products, processes, materials and
services are established and repositioned to the places they are suitable” (Rubenstein,
1989). Traditionally innovation theories emphasis technological innovations and are cat-
egorised to incremental and disruptive innovations (Markides, 2006). However, business
model innovations play increasingly important role in companies’ innovation activities
and often beat pure technological innovations (Chesbrough, 2007, p. 12). Disruptive in-
novation can create remarkable competitive advantage to companies. Companies can ei-
ther choose the strategy of first-mover or second-mover. Being first-mover may help to
occupy the whole market and bring a monopolistic position by controlling resources. Be-
ing frontrunner means also high costs and risks because it has to develop the new business
model from scratch. Being a second-mover can bring some free-rider benefits by imita-
tion, learning on the market and saving from research and development (R&D).(Schilling
& Esmundo, 2009)
Technological innovations
The roots of incremental vs. radical innovation typology are in technological innovations
(Dijk et al., 2015). Incremental innovations usually keep the same market and marketing
approach. They are based on the existing knowledge, technology or products of the com-
pany (Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010). Often they are low level of risk and developed
by small-scale experiments and problem solving inside the organisation (Bessant et al.
2014, p. 1284). They focus on improving products that mainstream consumers value (Dijk
et al. 2015). Better fuel efficiency of engines is a good example of incremental technology
innovation (Berninger et al., 2017). In some industries, this is highlighted whereas other
industries have much faster innovation cycles. For example, the new generation of smart
phones comes much faster to the market compared to energy production or new cars
(Canzler et al. 2017, p. 31).
Technological innovations are disruptive to the competitors when they propose new prod-
ucts and value propositions that do not fit in the producers competences and consumers’
current behaviours (Markides, 2006, p. 22). There are many examples of incumbent com-
panies having troubles managing disruptive innovations (Magnusson et al., 2003, p. 4).
Their aim is usually to achieve the dominant design that is approved by the whole industry
and only incrementally improved. The mainstream consumers regard disruptive innova-
tions worse in key functions but some consumers value some new features (Dijk et al.
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2015, p. 278). Abernathy and Clark (1985) divide the technology linkage of innovations
by disrupting or conserving competences.
Another way that highlights the technological side of innovations is examining the change
on component level linkages and the components themselves. Disruptive innovations
change also the role and choice of components that are used. For example, energy storage
may change the way grids are needed in the energy system. Incremental innovation typi-
cally keeps the same linkages between components but enhance their performance. In
addition to these innovation types, Magnusson et al. (2003) introduces architectural and
modular innovations. Architectural innovations keep the same type of components but
change their interfaces and the way they are used. In modular innovations, new compo-
nents are introduced but the linages between them remain the same.
Business model innovations
Companies have to develop business model innovations aside product innovations. If the
competitor has same product but better business model, they will capture the profits from
the market (Chesbrough, 2010). Business model innovators do not necessarily create new
products or services but instead change the way they are delivered to the customer and
this change can be disruptive or incremental. Garcia and Calantone (2002) divide business
model innovation into three categories: newness to the firm, newness to the industry and
newness to the customer. Business models have many different definitions depending on
what the author is highlighting and what is his or her background. In a much used work,
Timmers (1998) highlights information flows, Chesbrough (2007) value creation and cap-
ture. Aside product-oriented innovations, Tukker (2004) classifies business model inno-
vations into use oriented and result-oriented models.
Breakthrough innovations, like integration of internet in cell phones to transportation sec-
tor, can change business models disruptively. In general, they change the value network
and bring along business models that come outside company’s usual business paradigm
(Biber et al. 2017, p. 12). Sharing economy has many implications from disruptive inno-
vations. Uber, AirBnB and other companies that have changed the business models in
very traditional sectors, are good examples of business model innovations that pose chal-
lenges to regulation. Biber et al. (2017) claim that regime-shifting innovations involve
combination of new business models that leverage a breakthrough technology.
Incremental business model innovations develop the existing model but do not create dis-
continuities. Bucherer et al., (2012) take the case of new vehicle insurances as an exam-
ple. In their approach, new business models can be disruptive either for the industry or
for customers. For example, Better places, a Danish EV car sharing company tried to
change both of them.
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2.1.2 Innovation adoption
MacVaugh and Schiavone (2010) divide the adoption of innovation into three domains.
On micro-level, the adoption depends on learning conditions. On meso-level, the adoption
depends on social conditions and macro-level depends on technological conditions. The
micro-level refers to personal adoption of a technology. Each domain has to be thought
and evaluated, since they perceive the innovation adoption differently. Individuals eval-
uate the benefits and costs of change through their relationships and other community
members. Norms, values and hierarchies are shared within other people and affect the
desirability of different technologies. On macro level, there is an advantage for first mov-
ers to gain the dominant design. Microsoft Office software is one example of such devel-
opment. On a broader scale, this can mean technological lock-ins that makes it harder not
using a certain technology because of important complementary products are based on
one technology. Within this kind of development there are whole industry clusters grown
which are embedded in the social structures. (MacVaugh & Schiavone, 2010)
For personal adoption, which is the approach of this thesis, the most common framework
of innovation adoption is Rogers’s (2003) innovation adoption model. According to, the
innovation decision is a process which stages are knowledge, persuasion, decision, im-
plementation and confirmation (see figure 3). Customer chooses after every stage,
whether he/she will continue to the next step. The process is essentially an information-
seeking and processing activity. Each step aims to reduce uncertainty and communicate
the advantages of the innovation by the right communication channels. Generally, mass
media is better in giving the initial awareness and spreading information of the innovation
whereas peer-to-peer communication is more effective in shaping attitudes towards the
innovation.
Home energy systems are strategic purchases that take big proportion of household
budget, long-term commitment and high involvement in the process. Common factor of
such durables is that buying decision is complex especially if the price is perceived high.
Difference to frequently purchased items is that there is less possibility to try the product
beforehand and learn from errors. Compared to a car or a house, energy systems and their
use can also be less familiar for the customers. (Koklic & Vida, 2001)
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Figure 2. Innovation adoption process (Rogers, 2003).
Innovation adoption process begins when customer realises the existence of the innova-
tion, understands how it functions and how to use it efficiently. Gaining information is
usually framed by personality variables and socio-economic characteristics. Usually peo-
ple  are  selective  to  information  and  pick  to  ones  that  suit  their  opinions  and  interests.
Some researches see that individuals seek actively for information whereas some say that
individuals come aware of innovations more through coincidence. There might be a need
for the innovation before the awareness of the innovation is created or the innovation suits
a problem that is not conceptualised yet. Some customer segments are more probable to
adopt technologies and therefore act as important target groups for marketers and policy
makers. (Rogers, 2003)
Persuasion is a stage where customer evaluates the innovation and its attributes and forms
an attitude towards it. At this phase, the individual starts actively seeking and processing
information of the idea. Ability to imagine the future use of the innovation is important
for the planning of the adoption. For this purpose, he/she seeks more customised infor-
mation, which the mass media usually cannot provide. According to Rogers (2003), the
diffusion determinants at his stage are relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, ob-
servability and trialability. Relative advantage depends on the earlier experience customer
has on the similar technology and how much he or she has put resources in learning it.
Here, the individual perception of the advantages is more important than the objective
advantage. Switching costs can be perceived bigger if one has used some time to over-
come complexity issues related to the adoption. If the innovation is perceived difficult to
understand and use, customer will probably reject it. Compatibility means the closeness
of the innovation to customer’s earlier experiences, needs and values. Trialability refers
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to the possibility to experiment the innovation. Observability is the degree of visibility of
the value and benefits of the innovation.
Persuasion leads to decision of adopting or rejecting the innovation. Adoption can happen
also partially, because people often want to try the innovation before the final decision.
A possibility for small trial decreases perceived uncertainty and accelerates innovation
diffusion. Sometimes it is enough if a peer has tried the innovation. In these cases it is
also important whether the lead user or demonstrator is a so-called opinion-leader (von
Hippel, 2005). (Rogers, 2003) Even though the perception of the innovation might be
positive, he/she may still reject the innovation. This situation has been studied in the
KAP-gap (knowledge-attitude-practice) literature. This literature is often related to
Ajzen’s (1985) Theory of Planned Behaviour that attempts to explain the links between
values, beliefs, attitudes intentions and behaviour.
In implementation phase, the customer does the purchase and continues to evaluate the
usefulness of the innovation. Implementation leads to routinisation where new idea be-
comes part of his/her habits and everyday life. Customer might still be uncertain about
the innovation. Therefore, he/she gathers more information on the usage and operational
problems it has. Innovation might also be used in a different manner than was originally
intended by the inventor. This re-invention come from user’s modifications and changes
to the innovation. According to Rogers (2003), invention is a good word for describing
this change because it changes the inventor’s idea of the innovation. Re-inventing hap-
pens especially when innovation has many applications, it is implemented to solve a wide
range of problems or there is strong local pride of ownership. However, manufacturers
often create products which are not easy to modify or even repair (von Hippel, 2005).
In confirmation phase, the decision is already made but he/she is still looking for more
information on the innovation. This information either reinforces or creates need to re-
verse the adoption decision. A discontinuance of use can be divided in two categories: 1.
Replacement and 2. Disenchantment. Replacement happens usually in sectors where in-
novation cycles are fast and the new innovation just replaced the older innovation. Dis-
enchantment is decision to reject an idea because of dissatisfaction or poor performance.
In addition, wrong usage can push to rejection, which has been observed especially in late
adopter segments. Shih & Venkatesh (2004) extend the model to the usage phase of the
innovation by looking at frequency and ways of usage.
Adopter Segments
Customer segments are a common theme in marketing studies. This research area studies
consumer characteristics, demographics and how they change in time and experience
(MacVaugh & Schiavone, 2010, p. 199). The segments are showed in figure 3. The first
adopter segment, innovators, are characterised as technology-oriented risk-takers. They
have more resources and are closer to scientific groups developing the technologies than
other segments. The next group, early adopters, have the most influence in the opinions
15
of later adopter categories (Rogers, 2003). They are more careful in their choices than
innovators and usually they are well educated and informed. They are a very important
part of the technology learning and shaping because they create new knowledge and con-
ventions regarding the technology. As they are interested in the technology itself, they
can also become co-producers of it. They share experiences and solutions through peer-
observation, where people tend to have different needs and resources. That diversity
makes innovating efficient because probability of reaching the needed knowledge is big
(von Hippel, 2005).
Figure 3. Adopter segments (Rogers, 2003).
Early majority are the first to adopt technologies in a more mass-market oriented manner
but they do not have same opinion leadership as early adopters. Moore (2002) calls the
difference between early adopters and early majority ‘the chasm’ as it separates the vi-
sionaries and pragmatists who have different expectations on the technology. Pragmatists
value ready products and turnkey solutions.  Usually the diffusion of a technology accel-
erates after a certain stage when it has sufficient market scope. The diffusion spreads
progressively upon one market from early adopters to majority and laggards. Late major-
ity are relatively conservative who form the average participants. They might have less
financial resources and lower social status. Last group are the laggards who are sceptical
on new technologies and have an aversion to change. (Rogers, 2003)
2.1.3 Prosumers
Prosumers are “people who produce many of their own goods and services” and accord-
ing to Toffler (1981) there are many reasons to this. People have more time besides work,
and they are more educated. Workforce is expensive and do-it-yourself practices are seen
as self-actualisation, which brings satisfaction and better products. According to Kotler
(1986), there are two types of prosumers: “The Avid Hobbyist” and “The Archprosumer”.
The first ones mainly produce to exchange but makes some products also for own use.
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The latter refers to people who prefer to make almost everything by themselves thus
avoiding the mass consumption society.
Prosuming changes the usual value chains as customers’ role is expanded to create part
of the value creation. The idea behind prosuming is self-service. In prosuming context it
does not mean less service but facilitating participation and fulfilling individual needs
(Bremdal, 2013; Kotler, 1986). Prosumers see that they get more value from networking
than acting within one value chain. Typical examples of value networks come from web
domain and programming. Users are able to add their own work in shared platforms, like
Wikipedia, Linux-based software, 3D-printing applications, Lonely Planet and Trip Ad-
visor (Daly, 2016; IEA, 2014).
In the energy field, the definition of the prosumer is typically relatively simple, like: “con-
sumer  of  energy  who also  produces  energy  to  provide  for  their  needs,  and  who in  the
instance of their production exceeding their requirements, will sell, store or trade the sur-
plus energy” (Ford et al., 2016). Parag and Sovacool (2016) adds also the use of smart
appliances, communication technologies, EVs and battery storage capacities for flexibil-
ity services in the definition. Difference to current demand response (DR) markets, for
example, is remarkable as prosumers step from being reactive to price signals to being
active service providers to the grid. Prosumers’ influence in the market has to be high-
lighted as they affect and provide value not only to themselves but also to others: neigh-
bours, network operators and the society.
Energy prosumers are seen differently by emphasising differently the technicality and
human aspect of their involvement to the energy market (Olkkonen et al. 2016). The more
technical approach in literature links prosumers to intelligent systems such as EVs and
smart houses. When smart houses are linked to demand side response that supports the
electricity system, difference between energy production and home automation dilutes.
Furthermore, when prosumers are bundled together by an aggregator, they can act as vir-
tual power plants, which can be valuable resources to the electricity system.
The more behaviouristic approach of literature includes studies in energy communities
and behaviour. It highlights the legal framework in which prosumers act. Prosumers can
be seen as “active customers” highlighting consumer rights that they need from being
separated from utility-scale energy production (Roberts, 2016). Bleicher and Gross
(2015) see prosuming as co-development of RES within inventors and users. Olkkonen
et al. (2016) refer to prosumers also as producer-consumer-citizens since they can have a
distinctive impact in the community they act.
Some researchers combine these approaches. According to Shandurkova et al. (2012)
prosumer is an economically motivated entity that consumes, produces and stores elec-
tricity and energy in general; optimises the economic and to some extent the technologi-
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cal, environmental decisions regarding its energy utilisation and becomes actively in-
volved in the value creating effort of an electricity or energy service of some kind. Mean-
while they also change the usage patterns of energy by changing the values that are related
to energy consumption (Ellsworth-Krebs & Reid, 2016).
Motivations to invest in own energy production is a vastly researched topic. Balcombe et
al. (2013) did a research on microgeneration adoption and categorise the motivation fac-
tors as finance, the environment, security of supply, uncertainty and trust, inconvenience
and impact on residence. Karakaya et al. (2015) see in their case study that in grid parity
situation in southern Germany, environmental reasons and gained independence from
electrical suppliers are important motivators. IEA report (2014) on residential prosumers
mentions also status and prestige and interest in technology as motivators.
In literature on energy prosumers focuses not only on electricity but also heat and
transport (Ellsworth-Krebs & Reid, 2016). This limitation depends on the article’s ap-
proach. Possible technologies energy prosumers can use are solar PV, micro wind energy,
geothermal, small scale CHP (e.g. biogas) or hydropower (Brange et al. 2016; Ellsworth-
Krebs & Reid, 2016).
2.1.4 Prosumer activities
Prosumer participation in the market is coming more significant as technologies and reg-
ulation open new areas of the energy market for them. The main activities that are now
in sight are handled in this chapter and are shown in figure 4.
Prosumer
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Figure 4. Energy prosumer activities.
Self-consumption
Prosumers produce part of their own consumption with different microgeneration tech-
nologies. Most common technology is solar PV installed on roofs. Typically, the produc-
tion levels with solar PV is approximately 30% (Schill et al., 2017). Rest of production is
fed into the grid, stored or sold  (IEA, 2014). Self-consumption (SC) is relatively new
model because until recently all own production was fed into the grid and remunerated
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with a feed-in tariff (FIT) or net metering. The FIT used to be clearly above the normal
wholesale price of electricity and is still is given for tens of thousands investor homeown-
ers. With FIT model, prosumers continue to buy electricity from the utilities like before
(IEA, 2014). Self-consumption works in very different dynamic and incentivises to buy
smaller installations especially if own consumption is small whereas FITs incentivised to
buy as many panels as possible (Schill et al. 2017).
Community self-consumption
If the prosumers are not active themselves, there is also a possibility that they can join a
prosumer program running in their neighbourhood (Ford et  al. 2016). Community project
is a way for people to get together and think how they can develop their  energy usage
collectively. One example is a project where community is investing together in a wind
farm or other bigger plant nearby (Ford et  al. 2016). There are also many examples of
initiatives where a micro grid is created between households and people use their produc-
tions and storages collectively. Community micro grids are nowadays built on campuses,
suburbs, harbours or other bigger entities. They are seen from the distribution system
operator’s (DSO) perspective as one single connection point. Micro grids can have bene-
fits like added resilience, decreased losses and increased efficiency of the delivery sys-
tems (Adil & Ko, 2016; Koirala et al. 2016). Technologies that can be used on a commu-
nity level are mostly the same, but bigger, as at household level.
Demand response
Shifting consumption from darker to sunnier times of the day can mean, for example,
washing cloths during the day or adjusting thermostats so that they forecast the weather.
This changes usage patterns, knowledge, and values towards flexible and greener models
(Ellsworth-Krebs & Reid, 2016, p. 1992). It is similar to implicit DR, which happens
when consumers decide to choose dynamic pricing for their energy contract. The con-
sumers are exposed to time-varying electricity prices or network tariffs. However, in these
contracts consumers are not participating in balancing or ancillary service markets
(Bertoldi et al., 2016, p. 3).
Storing
Storing energy is a key for further integration of renewable energy (RE) in the grid be-
cause it is intermittent in its nature. Prosuming storage is called “prosumage” (producing,
consuming and storing) (Schill et al. 2017). Storing is usually done by installing a battery
in the house and charging it with own production that is not immediately used. Companies
like Sonnen are building services like trading on top of the batteries (Ford et al. 2016).
The level of activeness towards the system depends on how much smartness is integrated
to the storage and how it reacts to the market price signals. Firstly, the storage may only
focus on maximising self-consumption rates and not looking at market prices. Secondly,
the storage may have system-oriented shifts in charging by looking at market prices.
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Thirdly, the storage can interact with the market with flexibility services (Schill et al.,
2017, p. 147). Storing can be done also in the battery of an EV but then the electricity is
not necessarily used in the house but for transportation. When batteries and EVs do charg-
ing in a controlled way, they do not create peaks to the system (Pérez-Arriaga & Knitte,
2016, pp. 292-293).
Flexibility services
Flexibility services can be delivered through Virtual Power Plant (VPP) business model.
When entering the energy market individually is not economically or technically reason-
able, it can be done by an aggregator. An aggregator gathers many households into one
entity that can offer controlled demand shifts in the market. Aggregator is acting on the
same level as a retailer but delivers two-way transactions. The flexibility is offered to the
DSO or Balance Responsible Party (BRP) (EnergieKoplopers, 2016). Applicable tech-
nologies that can be aggregated are fridges, boilers, heat pumps, thermostats and other
appliances that do not have to be on constantly or have little impact on people’s everyday
life. In Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) solutions, EVs and batteries can provide flexibility ser-
vices by feeding electricity to the grid when car is parked and electricity prices are high.
Missing infrastructure and standards, skepticism of consumers, like concerns about car
batteries being charged when needed are issues that come up when as they become more
mainstream (Steinhilber et al. 2013). The prosumer connections and activities related to
the grid are illustrated in figure 5.
Figure 5. Prosumer activities related to the grid (Kotilainen et al., 2017).
Co-creation
Prosumers are also co-producers who engage in development of the production and busi-
ness models through co-creation (Bremdal, 2011; Olkkonen et al., 2016). As innovations
come from a network of players, the innovation process opens for many actors. Democ-
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ratised knowledge, harder control of expertise and ideas and venture capital have dimin-
ished borders of innovation and companies have shifted from closed innovation processes
into open ones. However, not all industries, like nuclear power generation, are willing to
open their innovation processes. (Chesbrough, 2003) Co-creation is an active, creative
and social process, based on collaboration between producers and users that is initiated
by the company to generate value for customers. It allows use of customers’ creativity,
improves customer relationships and enables the company to adapt market trends.
Innovation process can be divided into two main steps: the contribution of novel ideas
and selection of best ideas that are further elaborated. O’Hern & Rindfleisch (2008) cre-
ated a typology of these two tasks as illustrated in figure 6. The contribution activity
ranges from being fixed to company’s own processes or being open to everybody. Selec-
tion part ranges in a similar way from company’s own decision to power of the customers.
Figure 6. Types of customer co-creation (O’Hern, M. S., & Rindfleisch, 2008).
Collaboration is a process where customers have power to create and choose best inno-
vations.  For  example,  open  source  software  like  Linux  works  in  this  way.  Tinkering
means that customers make modifications to existing products and these changes are
taken into account when company releases the next version of the product. In co-design-
ing, customers provide new ideas to the company, which then typically lets customers
vote for the best models. Submitting often takes place by company’s invitation for new
ideas. Ideas are formatted in a way the company wants and the company also has the full
power to choose the innovations.
This framework is relevant to the energy field because people producing their own energy
are also developing their production. Yet, co-created ideas can be somewhat harder to
implement because the grid requires standardised interconnections and the appliances are
regulated in many ways. Prosumer co-creation happens most commonly by inviting user
to take part in product design processes and by gathering information on user preferences
related to temperatures, heating, bathing and showering. Some homeowners go further to
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technical issues like modifying and designing technical details or posting results on online
platforms. (Bleicher & Gross, 2015)
2.1.5 Innovation ecosystem
Gomes et al. (2016)  define innovation ecosystems as “a set for the co-creation, or the
jointly creation of value.” Adner (2006) describes them as “collaborative arrangements
through which firms combine their individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing
solution.” They are composed of interconnected and interdependent networked actors,
that include the focal firm, customers, suppliers, complementary innovators, advertisers
finance providers, universities, research institutes, standardisation organisations, custom-
ers and regulators.
The concept of an innovation ecosystem is replicated from biology. Essential aspect of
ecosystems is that everything is interconnected and all actions have complex feedback
loops to other species. Companies have to manage their innovation processes in complex
environments where the success of a product is dependent on the success of other players
too. Creation of value happens by offering it to the customer but also by sharing it with
other ecosystem actors. (Iansiti & Levien, 2004) Using other companies’ resources and
integrating to other companies form innovations that are hard to imitate. Company strat-
egy should be formed so that the consequences on the whole ecosystem are analysed.
Iansiti and Levien (2004) takes Yahoo, who controlled the internet ecosystem, as an ex-
ample of a too aggressive ecosystem leader. By making tough deals with their dot-com
partners, it weakened their profitability and in that way lost important players from the
ecosystem they were dominating. As innovations depend often on the whole ecosystem,
the first-mover position is challenging because of the uncertainty of external environment
and players (Adner & Kapoor, 2010).
Different players have different strategies in the innovation ecosystems. Iansiti and
Levien (2004) form a matrix of possible strategies (see figure 7).  Role depends on the
relationships to other companies and the turbulence of the environment.  If the company
shares  many  assets  with  other  companies  and  operates  in  a  turbulent  environment,  it
should aim to take the keystone strategy. Leading the ecosystem means solving major
technological problems and offering a stable technological framework and business op-
portunities to other companies. The keystone company also determines the ‘design rules’
of the ecosystem by standardisation of modules and their connections (Mäkinen &
Dedehayir, 2012). Common example is Google’s way of leading its ecosystem by gath-
ering information of its by-products (Iyer & Davenport, 2008). If the environment is rel-
atively stable and the market is mature but the company operates a complex network, it
can take the role of a physical dominator. By that, the company aims to integrate vertically
or horizontally and capture large part of the network. If the relations to suppliers and
complementary firms are clear but the field is in flux, a niche position may be the strategy
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to follow. In commodity strategy, the relations to other actors are less important. (Iansiti
& Levien, 2004)
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Figure 7. Roles in an innovation ecosystem (Iansiti & Levien, 2004).
Each company has its own customers, suppliers and complements depending on their
position in the ecosystem. Figure 8 shows a simplification of the relationships a focal firm
can have in an ecosystem. Being a complementor means having a product that enables
customer to gain better value from focal firm’s product or service. The positions of the
firms are not stable. Ecosystems evolve as the firms feed-off, support and interact with
each other while offering services and products to each other. The co-evolution of them
is best seen in ecosystems where complementors and component makers form their own
sub-systems. Sub-systems have their own development phases that are controlled by the
platform leader who connects the different sub-systems together. (Iansiti & Levien, 2004;
Mäkinen & Dedehayir, 2012)
Figure 8. Generic schema of an innovation ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor, 2010).
Adner and Kapoor (2010) divide external environment’s challenges into complement and
component challenges. If suppliers fail to adopt required components, the focal firm has
a bottleneck in its  ecosystem’s value chain.  In the same way, if  complementors fail  to
create complementing technologies, focal firm’s product is less valuable for the customer.
These challenges are also a way to gain competitive advantage based on learning curves.
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Solving technological problems within the ecosystem partners create processes that are
hard to imitate.
Besides the endogenous factors, there are also exogenous factors that influence the inno-
vation ecosystem development. These include social, economic and technological
changes in the environment. Adner and Kapoor (2010) describe the importance of exter-
nal actors on both sides of the supply side with the example of AirBus’ A380. This air-
plane was so much larger than earlier plane models that it required timely cooperation
and performance by airports, regulators and component suppliers. If the technological
changes converge outside the focal firm’s ecosystem, the original ecosystem may broaden
its scope to attain a part of the new development. The external development may also
produce a competitive ecosystem, which attract module developers out from the earlier
dominant ecosystem. (Mäkinen & Dedehayir, 2012)
2.1.6 Energy prosumer ecosystem
Ecosystem framework is relevant to the energy transition since it emphasises the connec-
tions of every actor and the need for complementary innovations (Adner & Kapoor,
2010). Energy field is changing, as it is getting more and more integrated with the trans-
portation and information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors. In addition, the
energy field itself is in integration as heating and cooling technologies are being electri-
fied and therefore more connected to other electrified functions of the systems. (Canzler
et al. 2017; Erlinghagen & Markard, 2012) The challenges electricity sector faces are in
many ways the same for transportation and heating sectors, for example stranding assets,
decarbonisation and changes in the distribution channels. The opportunities are also con-
nected. By connecting EVs to the grid, it is possible to diminish grid congestions pro-
duced by intermittent RESs. Combining offers of solar PV, storage and DR into a package
can add capacity usage of whole system.
The  ongoing  energy  transition   can  be  described  as  a  shift  from this  top-down supply
system to a multi-level exchange system (Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012). The traditional
grid system is formed of five components: energy source, generation, transmission, dis-
tribution and end user (Richter, 2012; Rodríguez-Molina et al. 2014). It is characterised
by centralised energy production, one-way communication, small amount of data and
censors, manual control and only a few user choices. In the past, power generation units
kept on growing for better efficiencies and economies-of -scale. Large number of cus-
tomers made it easy to predict the demand and behaviour patterns. Distributed energy
system, on the other hand,  means distributed energy generation, two-way real-time com-
munication and extensive control systems (Zame et al. 2017). It may also include loca-
tional pricing (Schleicher-Tappeser, 2012).
The market functioning is formed by an innovation ecosystem built around prosumers’
DERs. Depending on the business context, the focal firm of the ecosystem may be the
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solar PV installers, solar service firms or prefabricated home manufacturers (Strupeit &
Palm, 2016). Complementors and suppliers depend on the focal firm and may not have
been created yet. To reach the potential of the ecosystem, these interactions should de-
velop and bottlenecks solved. Issues for these interactions between complements and
components include:
∂ Smart meters and appliances are necessary for real time flexibility but replacing
old meters require a functioning DR market. If there is no demand for smart me-
ters, their diffusion is slower. (Knight, 2016, p. 8).
∂ Intermittent RES and big loads like EVs and heat pumps increase the need for
flexibility in the system. If their diffusion stays low, need for DR stays smaller.
These factors also create a saturation point for the DR market (Arteconi et al.,
2016).
∂ Developing grid scale energy efficiency eats consumer DR market (Knight, 2016,
p. 8).
∂ The profitability of batteries and DR is dependent on the deployment of the other
(Pérez-Arriaga & Knitte, 2016, p. 40). DR is less incentivised when having in-
vested to an energy storage.
The way the grid architecture will shape is also a political affair, since it will shape not
only technological innovations but also power relations between different actors. More
decentralised generation, distributed grid intelligence and active balancing in distribution
network will change big utilities’ current strong position in the market. The incumbents
have different approaches to the prosumer ecosystem. Some are resisting the change  and
shaping policies and regulatory framework to be supportive for their resources (Geels,
2014). In the energy transition, they build on their strengths like data ownership, pricing
and relationships and partnerships (PwC, 2010, p. 28). Prosumer technology choices are
highlighted on the distribution system level, where new investments have traditionally
been done according to the peak demand. Network operators’ customer contacts have
been limited to the grid connection phase, disruption calls, metering and billing but now
they are starting to manage different complex data sets. Now they face a new situation
where the old business-as-usual model will lead to extent investments and new smart
solutions are required to make the system sustainable (Pérez-Arriaga & Knitte, 2016, p.
46).
New entrants from other sectors like transportation, telecommunications and big data
firms start to cooperate and compete in the energy regime (Canzler et al. 2017). They are
interesting actors in the energy field that has long been seen as monopolistic industry
(Daly, 2016). Usually they have less difficulties to adopt new technologies in disruptive
changes (Adner & Kapoor, 2010). On the other hand, energy is still highly regulated field,
which gives advantage to incumbents. New entrants may alter the strategic positions of
the companies in the ecosystem that is illustrated in figure 9. Transportation sector with
EVs is linked to prosumer ecosystem through smart charging, V2G business model and
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battery infrastructure. EVs are now bigger investments than solar panels so they may be-
come the physical dominators of the ecosystem (Rubel et al. 2017). Accordingly, devel-
opment of battery manufacturing is currently an important piece of EV diffusion but af-
fects also the solar PV industry.
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Figure 9. Prosumer innovation ecosystem with technologies, focal firms and comple-
ments (adapted from Kotilainen et al., 2016).
ICT sector, which is strongly entering the market, functions as an accelerator of the re-
gime shift by enabling DR and aggregation (Markard & Erlinghagen, 2012). Aggregators
can control and optimise the combinations of technologies can become the value domi-
nators without owning much hardware themselves. They also handle interfaces to cus-
tomer DERs and system operators. Sensors, applications, smart meters and other software
based technologies form possibilities for niche strategies that have not existed in the en-
ergy field in this extent. Design rules and standardisation face local solutions but offer
also possibilities of leveraging the niche to bigger markets.
2.2 Policy interventions
According to de Lovinfosse & Varone (2004), public policies are “intentionally coherent
decisions or activities taken or carried out by public -and sometimes private- actors,
whose resources, institutional links and interests vary.” Public policy aims at channelling
the behaviour of a target population by the help of public effort to solve the decided prob-
lems. Policies can be rules or otherwise influencing mechanisms, which impose obliga-
tions, create incentives or build up capacity of the target group. Incentives are defined as:
“Rewards or penalties designed to induce one set of economic agents to act in such a way
as to produce results that another economic agent wants” (Black et al., 2017). The policy
design can be broken down into four elements that are shown in figure 10 (Sorrell et al.,
2003).
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Figure 10. Policy design elements (Sorrell et al., 2003).
Instrument is a new legislation, law, regulation or an initiative in order to achieve a certain
objective. Implementation network includes private and public actors who have to be mo-
bilised to implement the policy. In a multi-level policy context like the EU, the interme-
diaries, like National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs) between different levels play im-
portant role. Target groups are individuals or organisation that the policy influences di-
rectly or indirectly. Outcomes and objectives are the effects the policies are desired to
have.  In most cases there are several objectives and different stakeholders see them in
different ways. Outcome is determined by the analysed potential change to the current
situation the policy can create. For example, cost-benefit analyses are essential but often
challenging to implement. The context of the policy includes economic, political and cul-
tural factors that create circumstances and impose constraints for it. (Sorrell et al., 2003)
Success of the policy design depends on many details of the instruments (Mir-Artigues
& del Río, 2016, pp.275-276). Some elements are instrument-specific but some are com-
mon for all instruments. In energy field, eligibility of old plants, location specific support,
duration of the support and the flexibility of the support level are important risk factors
for investors. These elements can steer investments and whole system towards either cen-
tralisation or decentralisation. In addition, the way support costs are burdened has an ef-
fect on overall electricity price. Rogge and Rechardt (2013, pp. 13-15) add also more
general features to policy design: stringency, level of support, predictability, flexibility,
differentiations and depth.
Measuring policy success is a subject that has been researched a lot but has not been fully
answered. The criteria of a good policy intervention  is context specific and depends on
the sector company size, level of implementation and incentive design (Rademaekers et
al., 2012, p. 93). For example, transportation policy interventions are evaluated regarding
emission and pollution differences, health outcomes and alternative policies and technol-
ogies and even knowledge spill overs (Deshazo et al. 2017, p.20). In the field of RE, the
indicators are effectiveness, efficiency, equity, institutional feasibility and replicability
(IRENA, 2012).  According to Jaffe et al. (2005, p. 170) innovation policy’s success is
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uncertain and difficult to measure and is often not quantitatively measured. Ex-ante meas-
urements are especially difficult in long periods like in the case of climate mitigation.
However, general principles can be given. Following list is modified from Rademaekers
et al.'s list (2012, p. 11) company strategies in mind. Incentives should
∂ work in long-term but also supporting near-term investments,
∂ affect firms’ profitability and competitiveness,
∂ be transparent, simple and action orientated
∂ give pressure from supply chain (effective especially for small companies)
∂ linked to well-known programs like ISO certificates or common reporting
schemes and
∂ provide support to qualify for incentives is important especially for SMEs.
The broadening context of policies and interoperability of them is making the evaluation
of policy mixes more difficult. Policy mixes include many political objectives but also
many administrative domains, like transportation, environment, fiscal and climate poli-
cies (Kivimaa et al., 2017). Borrás and Edquist (2013, p. 18-21) combine the policy in-
struments to actions of Innovation System functions. Sorrell et al. (2003, p. 63) mention
that policy mix approach creates a situation where success of one instrument is dependent
on timing and the other instrument’s success. A multi-criteria analysis is usually con-
ducted with a matrix with quantitative or qualitative analysis (Sorrell et al., 2003, pp. 24-
25).
Multi-level governance
Multi-level governance in the EU context is defined as “system of continuous negotiation
among nested governments at several territorial tiers – supranational, national, regional
and local” (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). In public policy literature, the EU has brought up a
new kind of theoretical aspects of division of governance, which is different from the one
concerning independent nations, the United Nations and NATO, for example. The EU
includes complex relations between governments and the cohesion and integration-driven
policy.  Subsidiarity is  one of EU’s priorities meaning that decisions should be done as
close as possible to the citizens as far as the objectives can be met in that way. The EU
has a strong influence on the other levels of governance and may be used in questions
that handle specific matters where multi-purpose national bodies are not working on.
Nations have delegated some duties to the EU through different treaties with the Lisbon
treaty being the most important one. Competences in the energy field are divided between
the member states and the EU as stated in the Treaty of the EU and Treaty of Functioning
of the EU and their amendments. The EU steers their policies through directives, guide-
lines, research and funding and affect directly via energy saving standards and the emis-
sion trading system (ETS). Different types of EU laws are treaties, regulations, directives,
decisions, recommendations and Commission communications (Lane, 2015). (Bommel
& Bregman, 2013; SGTF, 2013)
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Member states can decide their own energy mixes, support schemes and taxing of energy
but they have to follow the EU directives. Also bilateral energy relations outside the EU
belong to member state competencies (European Commission, 2012). The interpretation
and implementation of different EU regulations may differ between countries. Many path
dependencies like earlier investments and cultural habits shape the regional implementa-
tion. For example, Scandinavia has traditions of consensus-driven policy and strong leg-
islation whereas in southern Europe informal connections are important. In addition,
some countries give more legal and administrative power to regions than others do. The
importance of regional level can vary from being a federal state to a sole administrative
level to a uniform state. Meanwhile part of the national power has been shifted to Brus-
sels, in some cases the regional power has increased. This is the case especially in regions
with strong lobbying power. (Keskitalo, 2010)
2.2.1 Industrial policy approach
Industrial policy has many different definitions depending on the country and time. Often
industrial policy is pursued through many policy instruments, like infrastructure provi-
sion, public procurement and defence an employment protection. Because of this vague-
ness, industrial policy has not clear taxonomy (Warwick, 2013, p. 17).  However, through-
out the different definitions and rationales, the goal of industrial policy is competitive-
ness, economic growth and productivity growth (Aiginger, 2007, p. 320). It is also a way
of solving problems in certain industries and allocating resources to macro economically
important fields.  In this thesis,  the widely used definition of  Pack & Saggi (2006) for
industrial policy is adopted: “Industrial policy is any type of selective intervention or
government policy that attempts to alter the structure of production toward sectors that
are expected to offer better prospects for economic growth than would occur in the ab-
sence of such intervention.”
Important aspect in strategic industrial policies nowadays comes from the internationali-
sation of manufacturing process and the shift to service-based business of many industrial
manufacturers (Warwick, 2013, p.11). These trends lead to thinking of value chain posi-
tioning which is illustrated in figure 11. As labour costs in industrialised countries have
increased, firms aim to cover the parts of the value chain that require more educational
workforce and in general use more human rather than natural capital. Automation is yet
again changing this landscape as companies are relocating the production due to decreas-
ing importance of labour costs.
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Figure 11. Economic value of activities in a traditional value chain (modified from
Warwick, 2013, p.12).
One approach is targeting certain sectors in attempt to create “strategic industries” with
industry-specific interventions, subsidies or trade barriers. Weiss (2011) describes this
kind of technology-specific activity as ‘promotional’ approach. This strategy was clearly
seen in the traditional approach of industrial policy, where governments gave subsidies
or other state aid to mainly domestic manufacturing industry (Warwick, 2013, p. 29).
There is no lack of arguments against such policies. Economists warn politicians of inef-
ficiencies that comes from picking winners, policies are prone for corruption and interna-
tional rules leave little space for national policy interventions (Rodrik, 2004, pp.36-37).
However, there are reasons for adopting such technology-specific policies. They are often
popular because they disperse the costs of focused benefits  (Jaffe et  al.,  2005, p.  169).
Some authors also claim that they are needed for creating sustained knowledge, market
distortions avoidance and path dependency (Groba & Breitschopf, 2013, p. 16). Weiss
(2011, p. 3) note the need for subsidising risk-taking activities. Nowadays, the attempt in
sectoral policy is to help infant industries to gain access to financial markets and certain
economies-of-scale by clustering policies (Aiginger, 2007, p. 316).
Opposite of sectoral policies are horizontal measures that are set to improve business
conditions in general. Weiss (2011, pp. 3-4) describes this kind of activity as market-
based approach. Governments may aim to facilitate and creating supportive framework
for business by correcting externalities, providing information and infrastructure. Strate-
gic trade policy through subsidies is another way of supporting industries (Warwick,
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2013, p. 21). If two exporting countries compete on the same markets, either one of them
or both may give subsidies to the exporting industry for winning the trade deals.
Industrial Policy
SelectiveHorizontal
Framework
conditions Strategic Defensive/Reactive
Figure 12. Typology of industrial policies (modified from Warwick, 2013).
Another way of categorising industrial policies is by the orientation towards technological
and societal changes. In other words, industrial policy may be defensive and reactive
towards landcape changes to protect workplaces. Some policies prevent industries of
dying for political reasons. For example, automotive industry got a lot of subisdies in the
USA after 2008-2009 financial crisis. Other policies promote change through inducing
innovation, new entrants, spoinoffs and new capbilities. Warwick (2013) also divides the
selective policies into strategic domains or technologies in which country should focus
and create competitive advantage.
2.2.2 Innovation policy approach
National innovation and technology policy aims to create national competitive advantages
and productivity growth. It creates preconditions and framework for generating inven-
tions and supports research and knowledge creation. National innovation strategies iden-
tify fields where country has potential to thrive economically and socially. (Meissner,
2014) It includes wide range of activities, which depend on the country and its techno-
logical development. It covers many areas from intellectual property rights to support for
new business and policy on basic research. Meaning of technology and innovation policy
depends on country’s development and priorities. More developed countries aim to be on
the cutting edge of innovation whereas less developed countries aim to facilitate the adop-
tion  of  innovations  from abroad.  In  general,  there  has  been  a  shift  from R&D policies
towards markets and commercialisation of innovations. It means that technology and in-
novation policy definition has widened to cover the whole innovation diffusion process
and markets have gained more attention.
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In environmental policies, the cost of externalities are internalised in a way or another.
Innovation policies are somewhat other side of the coin compared to environmental pol-
icies (Jaffe et al. 2005, p.165). It sees technology change from the angle of internalising
the external benefits of the technology adoption. This means benefiting from the front-
runner position and learning efforts. Adopting a less pollutive innovation can be costly
for the first adopters, and since the costs are decreased by policy intervention. Innovative
firms can create new knowledge that other firms and society benefit from. As the diffu-
sion and user base continues to spread, new adopters receive relatively higher value of it
than earlier adopters do. Basis of this hypothesis is that both users and producers learn
and make improvements to the technology during the diffusion process. (Jaffe et al.,
2005) Of course, the precondition of policy interventions is that the private actor has
problems in achieving the objectives on its own and public sector can help with it
(Edquist, 2014).
Usual categorisation of innovation policies throughout the innovation diffusion happens
within technology-push policies and demand-pull policies (Grubb, 2004, p. 10). Technol-
ogy-push approach would support research and demonstration stages of innovation cycle
through public R&D programs. The proponents of technology-push policies think it is
better to support technologies in the market only when their costs have already decreased.
The change in policy related to the innovation cycle and innovation policies is shown in
figure 13.
Basic R&D Applied R&D Demostration Pre-
commerical
Niche Market
& supported
commercial
Full
commercial
Demand Pull
Technology Push
Lab Market
Figure 13. Policy instruments in different sections of an innovation cycle (adapted from
Bürer & Wüstenhagen, 2009 and Grubb, 2004).
Demand-pull refers to commercialisation and bringing the innovations to the market. Pro-
ponents of this approach think that technological change comes with economic incentives
that push business sector to act. They also highlight the different market barriers for in-
novations to emerge in the markets (Grubb, 2004, p. 9). As the performance of the inno-
vation gets to the level of incumbent technologies, the policy instrument changes to more
market-based one that allows it to be fully commercialised. On the maturity level, the
technology can fully compete and aim of public policies is to form a level playing field
for all players in the market.
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Co-creation and networking policies
Framing innovation processes as linear processes, where the input and output can be
measured, has gained a lot of criticism. Base of this thinking is in methodologies of ac-
counting and economics, amongst others, which do not allow deeper analysis on the in-
novation process. Usual measurements are, for example, patent counts and gross domestic
product per capita (Yawson, 2009, p. 3). Such straightforward thinking is in contrast with
the systemic nature innovation processes. Understanding of innovation processes as iter-
ative and interactive processes has during recent decades start to affect policymaking
(Meissner, 2014). According to Smits and Kuhlmann (2004, pp. 6-9), innovation policy
planning include nowadays non-linear innovation models, open innovation, rise of sys-
tems approach, growing need for public-private partnerships, rise of uncertainty and need
for learning. Networks and social dimension is easily forgotten in the policy planning
(Meissner, 2014).
Innovation ecosystem includes non-linear interrelationships, different systems, niches
and pathways that come together (Yawson, 2009, p. 4). For example, managing interfaces
and providing platforms for learning and experimenting are examples of systemic policies
that support these trends  (Smits and Kuhlmann, 2004, p. 12).  Under the research frame-
work of Technological Innovation Systems (TISs),  business ecosystems are studied from
the functions point of view (Bergek, et al. 2015). These functions are processes, which
are central to the success of the TIS. They include entrepreneurial activities, knowledge
development, knowledge diffusion, guidance of search processes, market formation and
resource mobilisation (Hekkert et al. 2007). These functions highlight the importance of
communication and knowledge creation.
Different TISs interact and sometimes development of complementary TISs enforce both
sides. Knowledge sharing is important source especially for service innovations
(Meissner, 2014). Proximity has an positive effect on linkages between buyers, suppliers
and other institutions (Meissner, 2014). The EU supports these “smart specialisations”
also in the name of cohesion policy (Carayannis et al., 2017). Timing is important aspect
in ecosystem creation because the relationships and environment changes over time.
Von Hippel (2005, Ch. 8) discusses aspects of innovation policy from point of view of
open innovations. Firstly, intellectual property rights are an aspect that may become a
barrier for co-innovation practices. Although rearranging property rights is challenging
and not probable, effectiveness of patenting can be questioned as well as the policy effects
they produce. Companies can use patent thickets to create entry barriers and competition
in their sector. Secondly, companies create constraints in product modification. Own
modifications could be enabled by regulating products to certain direction. Thirdly, own-
ership of distribution channels hinders the competition efficiently and therefore the con-
tent and channels should be separated. Fourthly, traditional economic aid for R&D goes
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to companies themselves and not the lead-users who are increasingly important sources
of innovation.
Regulating disruptive business models
Sometimes business model innovations are so disruptive that they conflict with the cur-
rent regimes. Recent examples of these innovations come from the sharing economy busi-
ness models, which have changed transportation and housing sectors. Level of the inno-
vation is important because not all disruptive innovations cause problems with the current
regulation. The normative approach of policymaking determines how to react to different
disruptive innovations. If the country has ambitions on being an innovative frontrunner,
it might choose to encourage or at least not to restrict new businesses. One option is to do
nothing and let the old business model and regulatory structure decline. Other option is
to accommodate the new business and reform the existing legislation for it or create en-
tirely new legislation (Biber et al. 2017).
Biber et al. (2017) gather a toolkit of four policy strategies. First option is to block the
new business model totally and preserving the existing business structures. Second option
is to let the new business to proceed without interfering and imposing the incumbent busi-
ness to restructure. Third option is allowing the new business models but imposing them
with certain rules that are set to the incumbents too. The fourth and last option is to de-
velop a new legislative framework and structure of business where all players have neu-
tral conditions.
2.2.3 Environmental policy approach
Environmental policy aims at environmental protection and reducing industry’s effect on
nature and environment. Knoepfel (2006) states that it aims at assessing the state of envi-
ronmental pollution, evaluating this pollution in relation to the threat it poses to human
welfare and ecosystem and controlling pollution activities by means. Idea of including
external costs to economic growth and production and thereby to prices is an essential
aspect in environmental policies. Example of such externalities is pollution that a factory
creates but does not necessarily pay for. Instead, rest of the society pays this cost (Popp
et al., 2010). There are two way of dealing with the externalities: internalising the costs
of polluting to the factory or limiting the pollution by regulation. Factory might have to
install new equipment or change their products or inputs of the process. (Jaffe et al., 2005)
Basic categorisation of environmental policies is division to command-and-control and
economic instruments, which is widely used in public policies also on more general level
(Borrás & Edquist 2013; Rogge & Rechardt 2013).
Command-and-control instruments, the “sticks”, are used for creating market conditions
for sustainable products. They are rules and directives, like emission restrictions, that
form the framework in which interactions in the market and society take place. They are
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typically backed with threat of sanctions if they are not obeyed. People focusing on the
hierarchical side see that the sanctions are the most important aspect of them, while others
see the normative authority as the main outcome (Borrás & Edquist, 2013). Normative
authority means that regulation steers our ways of thinking on the desired outcomes.
There are positive and negative sides with the use of these tools. As they are performance
standards that explicitly tell what kind of technology should be used, they are not dynamic
and responsive (Groba & Breitschopf, 2013). Even though regulation has been efficient
in giving the desired outcomes, it has also proven to be resource intensive, both for regu-
lator and regulated companies (Rademaekers et al., 2012, p. 50).  Lately they have de-
creased their popularity because they have not guaranteed enough investments and can
cause technological lock-ins (Groba & Breitschopf, 2013). Furthermore, they are made
to form a level playing field for all actors but this might not be suitable for smaller com-
panies for bureaucratic reasons and lack of resources (Rademaekers et al., 2012, p. 98).
For this reason, there are administrative incentives, such as, reduced inspection fre-
quency,  which  can  induce  also  smaller  companies.  Patenting  is  also  a  possible  way to
induce innovations especially on the less mature technologies but also has effects of hin-
dering innovations (von Hippel, 2005).
Economic instruments, also called as the “carrots”, strengthen the market-based drivers
to lower emissions (Vedung et al., 1998). They can be encouraging and promoting certain
activities but they can also be disincentives restraining certain activities like polluting.
Examples of market-based policies are ETS, public investments and tax credits, public
funding, investment subsidies and infrastructure provision. They entail a risk of creating
lock-ins and pathways for technologies that once seemed the best option but did not turn
out to be on. Some also claim that these incentives are not efficient because companies
regard access to them difficult and think that eco-innovations with business sense do not
need subsidies (Rademaekers et al., 2012, pp. 41-42).
Third category with less attention are soft instruments, which include voluntary actions,
recommendations and labelling. In some contexts, they are also named as Information
tools because their aim is to shape general knowledge and opinions (Vedung et al 1998).
Information plays and important role in technology diffusion and is underprovided by the
markets (Jaffe et al. 2002, p. 8). Especially early adopter face large private learning costs
alongside other costs (Jaffe et al., 2005). Companies have different motivations for infor-
mational incentives. On one hand, they communicate environmental plans themselves for
stakeholders and marketing purposes. On the other hand, rankings, awards and recogni-
tion schemes by external actors may work as good benchmarking tools and influence
stakeholders (Rademaekers et al., 2012, ch. 3.3.5).
As it becomes clear, some instruments are more imposing than others, making it possible
to range the instruments according to their coerciveness (see figure 14). However, the
stringency is finally determined by the way an instrument is designed, implemented and
enforced (Persson, 2007).
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Figure 14. Stringency of environmental policy instruments (Persson 2007 modified
from Barde 2002).
The development of environmental policies can be divided into three waves according to
the same three dimensions. Until 1980s, the paradigm supported traditional command-
and-control regulation. However, regulation affected mostly the end-of-pipe products and
was questioned in the 80s as ineffective and costly. The second wave introduced market-
based instruments like pollution charges, taxes and tradeable permits. The third wave in
the 90s brought soft instruments like labels and voluntary approaches as reputation of the
companies in environmental matters started to become increasingly important (Persson,
2007; Rademaekers et al., 2012) .
2.2.4 Transition policies
Transition policy is a relatively new governance type, which aims to create disruptive
innovations that enable making system-wide sustainability transitions. It is based on
framework  of  Transition  Management  (TM),  a  research  field  that  studies  how to  steer
systemic changes (Kemp & Loorbach, 2007). It emphasises bottom-up developments by
coordinating self-organised experiments and other types of learning processes. Experi-
menting helps to decrease uncertainty and avoid locked pathways. It has also an adaptive
approach that supports co-evolution and self-organisation (Rotmans, 2006). The final aim
of transition policy is to change current regime’s industries to sustainable ones. Therefore,
economic growth is not the primary target. (Alkemade et al., 2011)
Transitions can be steered by politics to certain directions but full control is practically
impossible. Steering happens with coherent actions on different layers of governance:
strategic, tactical and operational (Kemp & Loorbach, 2007, pp. 5-6). The strategic level
holds top-down policies by which authorities set long-term goals, commitments and vi-
sions. Strategic level actions affect profound structures of the system so that the system
can sustain changes and is not only reacting to them. Liberalisation of the electricity mar-
kets is a good example of such structural change. Tactical level includes processes of
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agenda building, negotiating, coalition building and networking. The operational level
steers the pathway from bottom-up by experimenting, project building and implementa-
tion. Experience-based learning and feedback loops show the way to most sustainable
pathway. Policy makers should get information from the experiments and then continue
the transition in small-scale solutions. Experiments also spread ideas, values and attitudes
on macro level, which have an effect to the political regimes. Transition policies work in
a new transition arena, which is outside regular short-term policy cycles. (Berninger et
al., 2017)
The transition policy instruments can be divided into two categories: “niche support” and
“regime destabilisation” (Kivimaa & Kern, 2015). The niche support policies are some-
what traditional innovation policies that allocate resources for R&D and create market
conditions for innovations. The system transition is initiated in a safe niche environment,
which is protected from competition of the bigger market players. Experiments and initial
projects may offer a steep learning curve but do not in themselves guarantee market read-
iness and success. The difference between the initial demonstrations and market readiness
is often called the “death valley” (Schot & Geels, 2008, p. 538).
Policies that destabilise the current regime can be used to reinforce the Schumpeterian
“creative destruction”. These policies are typically command-and-control regulations that
strict for example polluting or limit some products from markets (Berninger et al. 2017).
They put pressure on the regime actors and put them on the same level as niche players.
Social network movements by changing ties of regime actors and government changes
the political agenda. Withdrawing support for dominant technologies, like fossil fuels can
further accelerate the transition (Kivimaa & Kern, 2015).
Path creation is important part of transition policies and is used to un-lock path depend-
encies. These paths enable to overcome regime shift barriers like regime’s economies-of-
scale production, cumulative learnings and existing networks of actors (Schot & Geels,
2008). The process of a path creation is done in three steps. Firstly, a vision for a potential
solution is created and communicated. Secondly, the actor groups, like researchers, lead-
users and producers network with each other and increasingly with regime actors. Thirdly,
path upscaling involves constant learning which steers it towards the vision.  A new path
is created when:
1. Actor networks are being established,
2. There have been triggering points like new supportive legislation done,
3. The course of the pathway is simultaneous and the pathway options are narrowed
down,
4. Course is self-reinforcing and
5. The path-creation produces lock-ins and established practices. (Sydow et al. 2012;
Berninger et al. 2017)
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There has been also criticism towards transition policies. Visionaries initiate the transi-
tions but their work has not got enough attention in the research. Also, transition policies
face many political challenges that make their implementation messy and difficult
(Meadowcroft, 2009).
2.2.5 Policy mixes
A policy mix is defined as set of different and complementary instruments to address
identified problems (Borrás & Edquist, 2013). Policy mixes are a result of a process in
which the instruments are debated and chosen (Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 2011). A
profound building block of the policy mix is the policy strategy. Rogge & Rechardt (2013)
define policy strategy as combination of policy objectives and principal plans for achiev-
ing them.
In most cases, policymaking is a set of compromises that adjust to existing policies. New
goals and instruments are being “layered” on top of old policies. The goals may remain
the same but the instruments for achieving them change (“drift”). In addition, it is possible
that the goal changes without change in the instruments (“conversion”). These solutions
built on old goals or instruments produce often incoherent policy mixes (Howlett &
Rayner, 2007). The policy problem articulation determines the instruments that create the
pathway towards the vision. Same target can be tackled in many different ways. For ex-
ample, developing ICT sector has been done by attracting foreign investments, supporting
own private sector’s industrial R&D with public grants or by creating public research
activities (Borrás & Edquist, 2013).
The instruments have to be aligned with each other so that their interactions are mutually
reinforcing. The analysis of policy interaction includes identification and evaluation of
the consequences different policies have together. Instruments’ target groups and their
activities may be different and change during time. Elements between instruments that
should be analysed are scope of interactions, nature of their goals, timing, operation and
implementation processes. This process is illustrated in figure 15. (Rogge & Rechardt,
2013; Sorrell et al., 2003)
Figure 15. Policy instrument alignement (Sorrell et al., 2003).
Firstly, the scope of policies is estimated by the degree of who are affected. This can be
divided into main target group and the identification of indirectly affected groups. Scope
can also be evaluated on level of activity or technology (Sorrell et al., 2003, pp. 57-58).
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Secondly, the policy objectives of different instruments are analysed by their degree of
compatibility. These targets are accompanied with road maps and strategic action plans
(Rogge & Rechardt, 2013). In theory, all RE policies try to reduce emissions, but their
logic of doing so can include conflicts. Finding common objectives in energy field is
challenging because different stakeholders have different interests and approaches. These
objectives are summarised in table 1 by each policy approach studied earlier. Inconsistent
targets can result in inefficient policies, and therefore the targets should be integrated.
(Kivimaa, 2008) The objectives may be in conflict if other instrument’s target undermines
other’s target. The objectives can be also reinforcing if one objective reinforces or com-
plements other achievements. This happens if two instruments target different aspects of
the same problem. (Sorrell et al., 2003, pp. 58-60)
Thirdly, the operation of the instruments on the target groups are estimated qualitatively
through relative size and importance of each incentive, the likely response of the target
group and evaluation of which incentives will dominate. There can be overlapping effects
and an instrument can become redundant by another one. This happens when one policy
is considered adequate to get to the objective. For example, having restrictions on some
products and subsidies on other products may not be necessary. Policies can also operate
counterproductively or be neutral or complementary. (Sorrell et al., 2003, pp. 60-61)
Fourthly, the implementation phase should be designed so that regulators tasks can be
compatible and same work do not have to be done twice and responsibilities are clearly
addressed. Complex and insufficient structures may cause inefficiency for results. Espe-
cially in technical fields like renewable energy, legislators should cooperate with the in-
novators to ensure the policy implementation and the market functioning after the policy
intervention. (Sorrell et al., 2003, pp. 61-62; Rogge & Rechardt, 2013)
Finally, the timing of the instruments includes responses to triggers and policy sequenc-
ing. Flexibility and policy predictability form a trade-off and a tension regarding the time-
table (Sorrell et al., 2003, pp. 62-63). This also relates to the innovation phase the tech-
nology is in (Rogge & Rechardt, 2013).
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Table 1. Policy approach comparison.
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Moving from one instrument to a mix of policy instruments means classification of main
instruments and complementary instruments. It helps at creating the policy mix from dif-
ferent perspectives. Looking at common typologies show that these categories are differ-
ent in nature and policy inclusion is varies.  For example, command-and-control policies
are included in regime destruction policies; financial incentives are included in all cate-
gories in other policy approaches. Division of industrial policy to horizontal and sectoral
policies is a distinct from others, yet useful categorisation for other approaches as it de-
fines the scope of policies. By the instrument categorisation, closest approaches seem to
be innovation and transition policies by looking at the timing of the policy according to
technology’s market readiness.
2.3 Regulating energy prosumer ecosystem
This chapter aims at combining the earlier literature from innovation theories and poli-
cies. It connects the typologies of policy approaches in prosumer innovation ecosystem
and the introduced ecosystem strategies. It also structures the policy interventions from
the prosumer’s point of view.
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Countries that adopt the industrial policy approach related to prosuming, want to make
use of their country’s resources but not necessarily make big changes to the regime posi-
tion.  If  they  aim at  physical  or  value  dominator  position  it  would  mean creating  com-
petiveness by controlling value networks but also developing own manufacturing. Value
chain position is important in regard the energy ecosystem. If large companies control
certain part of the value chain, new entrants have to ally with incumbents (Hekkert et al.,
2007; von Hippel, 2005). Aiming to this position requires horizontal policies lowering
entry barriers and transaction costs. Difference to the earlier energy business with just
handful of players is vast. Opening innovation spaces is happening by platform business
models, which are utility adopt more and more (Parag, 2015). The downside of creating
only horizontal policies is that the formation of complex supply chains and complement-
ors may be difficult when the future of the market is unclear.
Countries emphasising innovation policy aim at competitiveness but include also societal
issues in the strategy. They may specialise to certain technologies in which they already
have relative advantage and knowhow. The innovation policy approach indicates that
technologies should be under different political intervention in different stages of the
lifecycle. Solar PV and different communication technologies like smart meters, are al-
ready relatively mature and market ready. Other products, like energy storages, are still
more on the niche side but becoming mainstream quickly. Systemic effects of the policies
and complementary technologies should be thought when planning these policies. Net-
working are cluster policies are important when attaining the value of these technologies.
The transition policy approach adds disruptiveness to innovation policy approach. It high-
lights the importance of destabilising current regime by command-and control policies.
Because it emphasises bottom-up movements, direction is most notably decentralisation
of the whole system, which easily means restructuring of tax collection and new rules
with infrastructure. The aim is to replace the fossil fuel generation, which means that
widespread RE should win the incremental fossil fuel developments. In that sense, this
strategy is connected to commodity-oriented but also niche-oriented strategies. Transition
is systemic and aside energy sector, building and transportation sectors apply policies that
impose manufacturers to change their products. Through niche creation, it is possible to
create acceptance for new sustainable technologies, like DR solutions but also networking
within different actors.
Environmental policies have similar targets as the transition policy approach. However,
changing regime actors is not necessarily in its agenda. It mainly aims at decreasing heav-
ily the use of fossil fuel generation and avoiding excess investments in grid lines. It is
therefore leaning towards commodity and physical dominator strategies. Command-and-
control regulation works as a destabilising force but more importantly imposes better en-
ergy efficiency by internalising pollution costs to consumer prices. Added information
for consumers means they realised the environmental and monetary value of sustainable
choices better.
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The next chapters will look at the effects of regulation from prosumer’s point of view.
Policy mix is concretised in customer’s innovation adoption process. Aim is to show the
strengths and weaknesses of the national innovation ecosystem policies. A policy instru-
ment that  is  missing from the process or not aiming towards same target may result  to
overall inefficiency (Howlett & Rayner, 2007). Journey is linked to innovation ecosystem
theory by seeing prosumer actions and policies as complementors and suppliers. In prin-
ciple, each phase of prosumer’s adoption process relates to the earlier phase’s success.
The framework of this thesis, illustrated in figure 16, starts with the knowledge phase,
which includes political decisions that are seen as prerequisites for the prosumer ecosys-
tem. In a way, they enable the prosumer journey to begin. They are technology-neutral
policies and merely regulative in nature. In the energy field the tendency is away from
“natural monopolies”, so these policies are deregulating the market and opening new op-
tions for consumers.
Policies in the persuasion phase are merely sectoral policies as they steer consumers to
choose certain technologies. They are a mix of informational, regulatory and financial
policies that affect the decision by either excluding or incentivising different technolo-
gies.  They  affect  the  fixed  costs  of  the  purchase.  Informational  policies  aim to  inform
consumers on different technologies but they can also be used to support energy efficient
solutions in general. In this customer journey, the financial policies are divided into ones
that affect in the purchasing phase, namely investment subsidies, and ones that affect the
usage phase. Investment subsidies are usually technology specific and include different
conditions on the support. However, their impact in the energy market is less imminent
since they do not affect prosumer’s behavior during the usage phase.
Implementation phase policies are a set of regulatory and financial policies that affect the
operational costs and benefits of the technology. These policies are typically technology-
neutral as they include regulation like how to interconnections are handled, how multi-
family houses get involved, does RE have a guaranteed access to the grid, how the net-
work tariffs and taxes affect the usage of the system. However, these policies can change
according to different system sizes and technologies. These policies determine how well
the prosumer is engaged with the product.
The policies in the confirmation phase are technology specific policies for complement-
ing technologies, namely batteries and EVs. It also holds aggregation regulation, which
is an enabler for many different technologies on the DR side. Aggregation regulation is
in principle technology neutral policy that includes valuation of flexibility by different
resources in the energy market.
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Figure 16. Prosumer journey and regulation related to each step.
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It should be mentioned that the process is indicative and includes many feedback loops
that are not as linear as the process introduced suggests. Here presented prosumer journey
is  not  the  only  possible  way to  enter  the  prosumer  ecosystem.  EV adoption  as  well  as
participation in DR may lead in investing to own solar PV panels, for example. In addi-
tion, there are so-called passive prosumers who have not been actively seeking to invest
in DERs. They have bought a house or an apartment that has already had microgeneration
or has a leasing contract to one but not especially sought for such a functionality (Ford et
al. 2016). The choice of concentrating on the micro production purchase is done for sim-
plifying the process and because according to the general definition of prosumers, own
production is element that every prosumer has and other DERs are accompanying it (see
Ch.  2.1.3.).  Finally,  the  process  is  also  simplified  by  leaving  out  possible  services,  as
consultations, utilities and third party actors can have along the prosumer journey.
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Methodological approach
The aim of this study is to compare prosumer related regulation and incentives in different
European countries. Cross-national comparisons of public policies are conducted for dif-
ferent reasons like understanding how national contexts and ideologies affect the success-
ful implementation of certain policies (Dupiuis & Biesbroek, 2013). Hua et al. (2016)
notice that comparative policy studies are important for global RE studies as they observe
also the policy learning effects between countries. They can provide understanding of the
fundamental drivers of policy-making and how they are impacting the world (Dodds,
2012).
The thesis takes a pragmatist approach since the research questions demand and twofold
approach. On one hand this thesis aims to collect and compare the policies objectively,
meaning it takes merely a positivist approach. Assumption is that researcher is independ-
ent, value-free and is not affected by the subject researched. (Saunders et al., 2009) On
the other hand, the research explores how the policies affect the prosumer innovation
ecosystem, which demands more realist approach. In realism, researcher interprets the
research issue and sees the findings are probably true (Healy & Perry, 2000).
The research questions demand also a combined research strategy. Comparing policies
means merely a deductive approach but studying the ecosystem formation demands an
inductive approach. Inductive research describes the problem rather than proofs a hypoth-
esis. Inductive approach is needed because of the novelty and nature of the research sub-
ject. Prosumer ecosystem has been studied from each sub-system’s point of view and
policy studies are always context specific (IEA, 2014). The prosumer ecosystem is only
now being created as prosuming has not been the paradigm for a long time. As there is
only short time of data on the effects of the prosumer related policies, a cross-sectional
time horizon is chosen. Policy analysis usually relies on historical developments with
longitudinal or synchronic approaches (Dupiuis & Biesbroek, 2013, p. 3).
As the research questions look answers to question “what?”, the country comparison is
not a pure case study, which usually answers to questions “why?” and “how?”, but a
comparative research.  As a notion to reader, the studied countries are still called as ‘case
countries’. For the limited resources, the research is conducted as secondary data research.
Secondary data can be categorized into documentary and survey data (Saunders et al.
2009). Documentary data is typically used aside primary data collection but can be used
also on its own in business history research, for example. Documentary secondary data
include both written and non-written materials, but this thesis is only based on written
material (Saunders et al., 2009, p. 258). Primarily, this thesis is based on information
45
found in industry reports provided by European industry associations and regulatory in-
stitutions on the national and EU levels.
When sources vary a lot, evaluating data source quality is important. Saunders et al.
(2009) propose a three-step evaluation process for secondary data sources.
1. Assess overall suitability, like measurement validity and coverage of data to re-
search questions and objectives.
2. Evaluate precise suitability, like validity, reliability and measurement bias, of data
for analyses needed to answer research questions and meet objectives.
3. Judge costs and benefits in comparison to other alternative sources.
Especially the second step in this process is important for this thesis because industry
association reports are presumably biased towards their political agenda. However, they
are in some cases also the most detailed source of information on the European level
because their mission is to have good connections to all member states. Comparing in-
dustry papers to governmental sources can indicate which reports are of high validity. On
the other hand, governmental papers may be overly conservative in their opinions.
Coverage of these reports is important to check country by country because the federal
level information may not be accurate in all parts of the country. For example, Switzer-
land and Italy have delegated important duties to cantons and regions so the federal level
indicators may show only the average information.
3.2 Case countries
Due to limited time and resources, the scope was limited to five countries, namely Swit-
zerland, Finland Germany, Italy and France. The case countries are also the same as in a
wider research project conducted within Tampere University of Technology and the Uni-
versity of Tampere. The countries represent well-developed countries with strong indus-
tries and welfare. This reduces confounding factors that arise from effects that cannot be
distinguished from another factor (Kitchenham et al. 1995). Having a similar environment
under the EU influence also helps choosing dependent variables for each policy instru-
ment discussed. However, there are also many differences between countries. Firstly, ge-
ography of the countries vary remarkably, which also explains partly their energy mix
choices. Secondly, they vary in their elements of the socio-technical regime: energy pol-
icies and regulation, energy production profiles, public perception of RE and knowledge
and routines (Berninger et al.  2017). Yet, they are all integrated in the European energy
market and all except Finland are situated in the heart of the central European markets.
Creating the Energy Union under the European Union legislation harmonizes the regula-
tion but national energy policy strategies remain different.
Swiss electricity system is experiencing changes in the amount of hydropower, nuclear
energy and RE. Decision to phase out nuclear energy increases intermittent energy supply
46
in the energy mix (SEDC, 2017). Many Swiss DSOs are owned by municipalities and
forced to build and incentivise RE within local prosumers (Hüsser, 2016, p.25). The VPP
tiko is a frontrunner in smart grid solutions in Europe and a good example of Swiss inno-
vativeness in the DR side (Tiko, 2017).
Italy  is  Europe’s  second biggest  market  of  solar  PV.  It  has  a  history  of  energy  saving
policies and it is a frontrunner in smart metering. Its electricity mix is based on natural
gas and it decided to phase out its nuclear plants after the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986.
Its  share  of  RE  in  2015  of  total  energy  consumption  was  17.5%.,  which  means  it  has
surpassed its target for 2020 (17,0%) (Eurostat, 2017). It has one of the highest prices of
electricity in Europe, which also makes it attractive market for self-consumption and en-
ergy storage businesses. It has had challenges in integrating islands to mainland and inte-
grating northern parts of the country to the south. (IEA, 2015)
Germany became the frontrunner of RE with the help of EEG starting in 2000. After the
events in Fukushima in 2009, it decided to phase out from nuclear power before 2022. Its
share of RE in 2015 of total energy consumption was 14.6%. and the target for 2020 is
23,0% (Eurostat, 2017) Electrification of the powerful car industry steers also the way of
Germany’s prosumer ecosystem.
Table 2. Case country information (Ahola, 2015; Altenhöfer-Pflaum, 2014; Berninger et
al. 2017; Castello et al. 2015; Hüsser, 2016; Kaaijk & Durand, 2016; Tews et al., 2016).
Italy Finland Germany France Switzerland
Electricity
generation
mix, top 3
(IEA 2015)
Gas 40%
Coal 14%
Hydro 16%
Nuclear 36%
Hydro 26%
Biofuels &
waste 16%
Coal 44%
Nuclear 14%
Wind 13%
Nuclear 78%
Hydro 10%
Wind 4%
Hydro 58%
Nuclear 35%
Biofuels &
waste 4%
PV installa-
tions in 2015 298 MW 5 MW 559 MW 850 MW 300 MW
LCOE of un-
subsidized PV
(Huld et al.,
2014)
0,12 €/kWh 0,22 €/kWh 0,17 €/kWh 0,15 €/kWh 0,15 €/kWh
PV installa-
tions total
18,9 GW (end of
2015)
20 MW (end of
2015)
38,6 GW (end of
2014)
6,6 GW (end of
2015)
1,36W (end of
2015)
Current politi-
cal agenda High energyprices, energy
market liberalisa-
tion.
Dependency of
imports. Future
role of CHP
plants and bio-
mass.
North-south grid
expansions. Nu-
clear phase out by
2022. Social ac-
ceptability of ris-
ing electricity
prices.
Reduction of
nuclear to 50 %
of electricity
mix. Financial
problems of sec-
tor players.
Nuclear phase
out by 2025.
Declining hy-
dro.
Country-spe-
cific factors
(IEA 2017)
First EU country
to install smart
meters. Nuclear
phase out in
1980s.
Dark long win-
ters. Expansion
of nuclear ca-
pacity. Integra-
tion in Nordic-
Baltic market.
Home ownership
rate only 52,5%.
Strong car indus-
try.
Highly central-
ised energy sec-
tor.
Utilities typi-
cally owned by
municipalities
and relatively
small.
Finland has a relatively centralised energy regime based on nuclear energy and CHP
plants for electricity and heat (Berninger et al. 2017). RE comes mainly from bioenergy
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due to strong role of forest industry. Finland’s position in the north makes use of solar
power challenging. It is reliant on electricity imports during peak demand periods but
commissioning of Olkiluoto 3 plant will ease the situation. It is part of the common Nor-
dic electricity market Nordpool. Its share of RE in 2015 of total energy consumption was
39.3%., which means it has surpassed its target for 2020 (38,0%). (Eurostat, 2017)
France has a highly concentrated electricity markets with regulated tariffs. Renewable
energies are less established compared to its neighboring countries. It aims to lower its
use of nuclear energy to 50% of its electricity usage by 2025 and on the same time in-
crease the amount of RE (IEA, 2017b). Its share of RE in 2015 of total energy consump-
tion was 15.2%. and the target for 2020 is 23,0% (Eurostat, 2017).
3.3 Policy inclusion
Choosing the policies affecting prosumers was done according to their relevance and
comparability. For finding out the relevance, recent prosumer-related reports, position
papers and articles were gathered and occurrence of different policy actions was listed
(see table 2).
Table 3. Initial policy papers and articles for policy inclusion.
Already published cross-country comparisons IEA, 2014; RES Legal, 2017; Veum et al.,
2016, steered the choices related the possibilities to make a cross-country comparison.
The comparability of policies is not always easy to implement because in some countries
the policies are implemented in different level. Local-level policies, like information cam-
paigns were excluded. If the policy is usually state-level, like grants, it was still included
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in the scope. Standardisation was mentioned in many papers but is related to many issues
and hard to compare and therefore it was left out of the scope. ‘Transparency of incen-
tives’ or ‘policy stability’ was mentioned in many papers but it is also difficult to compare
between countries, so it was leaved out of the scope. Dynamic pricing was also mentioned
in many papers but it is handled under market liberalisation since offering different pric-
ing schemes is related to market opening. After going through the data, they were nar-
rowed down into 16 topics. Tax benefits, soft loans and grants were gathered under ‘in-
vestment aid’ and data management, and explicit demand response and data management
were handled in Aggregation chapter.
The research was conducted through secondary documentary data, and this has to be taken
into account when evaluating the validity of the results. The outcome is not exhaustive in
a way that it would include every support system for RE. Political interventions that affect
prosuming more indirectly include, for example R&D grants for companies, ETS, carbon
taxes and policies affecting education and consumer awareness in general.
3.4 Data collection
The data used in the thesis is secondary data. Main data sources were European-level
industry associations and advocacy organisations and reports for European Union insti-
tutions. Research reports conducted for the European Commission or the European Par-
liament were done by research centers like Smart Grid Task Force (2015) and consortiums
(Veum et al., 2016) or regulatory bodies, like CEER (2017). Used associations were, for
example, BEUC (2016), Eurelectric (2015), EuroBAT (2016), Smart Energy Demand
Coalition (2017), SolarPowerEurope (2015) and Client Earth/Greenpeace (Roberts,
2016). European Commission’s online database on country-specific regulation was also
useful but not always accurate (RES Legal, 2017). Full list of sources is in table 4.
Academic journals were used in cases where the data was not accurate enough or needed
more explanation. This sequence was due to the delay of academic publications. In the
fast moving energy field, these publications tend to lose their accuracy even though they
provide more in-depth analysis on many developments. They were used more as a source
when describing the regulatory measures investigated. These papers were searched from
Google Scholar and Web of Science with search words from each sector. For example,
regulation of battery storage was searched with words “energy storage” and “European
Union”. The data is complemented and validated with information from national and re-
gional sources like utility websites and consumer helping websites. This kind of search
from sources in German and Italian sources was not done due to language barrier, which
is taken into account when evaluating the validity of the results from these countries.
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Table 4. Used secondary data categories and sources.
Sourc
e Italy Finland Germany France Switzerland
G
ov
er
nm
en
ta
l/
in
te
rn
at
io
na
lo
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
Castello et al. 2015
RES Legal, 2017
IEA, 2016b
Veum et al., 2016
AF-Mercados EMI,
2015
Cambridge Eco-
nomic Policy Asso-
ciates Ltd, 2017
IEA-PVPS, 2016
European Commis-
sion, 2015
IEA-HEV, 2016
Finnish government,
2017
IEA, 2017a
Ahola, 2015
RES Legal, 2017
AF-Mercados EMI,
2015
Energiavirasto, 2017
Eurostat, 2017
European Commis-
sion, 2015
Bertoldi et al., 2016
SGTF, 2015
Sähköinenliikenne.fi
, 2017
RES Legal, 2017
Marzocchi, 2016,
p. 28
Veum et al., 2016
SGTF, 2015
IEA, 2017
de l’Elpine,
2017
RES Legal,
2017
Hespul 2015
Courtel 2017
Kaaijk & Du-
rand 2016
Bertoldi, Zanca-
nella, & Boza-
kiss, 2016
SGTF, 2015
Ministère de
l’Environne-
ment de l’Éner-
gie et de la Mer,
2016, 2017
EDNA, 2016
OCEN 2013
IEA, 2013
Canton de
Geneve, 2017
Hüsser, 2016
RES Legal,
2017
IEA-HEV,
2016
In
te
re
st
gr
ou
p
Dunlop & Roesch,
2016
BEUC, 2016
ACEA, 2017
Eurelectric, 2015b
Eurelectric, 2015b
SEDC, 2017
FinSolar, 2017
ACEA, 2017
Lehto, 2016
BEUC, 2016
Eurelectric,
2015b
SEDC, 2017
Dunlop &
Roesch, 2016
ACEA, 2017
Tietge et al. 2016
SEDC, 2017
Eurelectric,
2015b
SEDC, 2017
AEM, 2016
A
ca
de
m
ic Valles et al., 2016 Erlinghagen et al.,
2015
Tews et al., 2016
Valles et al., 2016
Strupeit & Palm,
2016
Valles et al.,
2016
O
th
er
Mayr, 2016 CMS, 2015a
EcoInfos, 2017
CMS, 2015b
SIG, 2017
Romande Ener-
gie SA, 2016
The aim was to gather the most current information of the regulation and incentives used
in the countries. This is because the regulation is changing rapidly across Europe due to
the liberalisation of the energy markets and changes in DER technology prices. Therefore,
data from sources published before 2016 were checked and used only if more timely in-
formation was not available.
3.5 Data analysis
The thesis is divided into chapters of different parts of the energy prosumer ecosystem.
This ecosystem is structured within different phases of an energy prosumer journey,
which starts with installing own energy production and then extending the system with
EVs, batteries and DR. The journey model is common way of demonstrating the purchase
of residential solar PV system. It is used oftentimes by utilities, help centers or associa-
tions when explaining the bureaucracy steps (e.g. Caruna, 2017; Dunlop & Roesch, 2016;
EcoInfos, 2017). Customer journey enables quick digesting of the process, addresses
complex non-linear nature of the journey, generates ideas and discussion and encourages
to work with diverse teams (Ortbal et al. 2016).
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The phases of the journey are derived from Rogers’ innovation adoption model (Rogers,
2003). The prosumer actions illustrated in this thesis are modified from the solar PV cus-
tomer journeys used by utilities mentioned earlier. Each policy instrument is attached to
certain prosumer activity. The indicators should measure the actual phenomenon
(Carmines & Woods, 2005). Each policy has its own indicators that replicated from the
data sources used. Besides availability, relevance and comparability steered the indicator
decisions. Analysis aims to describe the policy pathways countries take. The data of each
regulatory issue from each country is summed up in an Excel table in the Discussions
chapter. There, it is also evaluated within a three-level scaling, modified from BEUC
(2016), IEA (2014), Veum et al. (2017) and Ranchordás (2015).
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.1 Phase 1: Knowledge
4.1.1 Liberalisation of the energy markets
Bringing new innovations to the market happens by removing barriers for competition.
Especially prosumer innovations needs working retail markets where consumers have real
options and utilities develop different products and energy services. Before the liberali-
sation of the energy markets, the utilities in Europe were, and in some cases still are,
monopolies that are owned by the state (Barrett 2017). Political actions on institutional
changes related to market liberalisation include grid access rules, network pricing, risk
management, market transparency and consumer protection (Markard & Truffer, 2006).
Unbundling DSOs from generation activities ensures that all actors have access to the
network. CEER (2015) measures market functioning by low concentration, low market
entry barriers, close relationship between wholesale markets and retail prices, range of
offers like DR, availability of  comparison tools and consumption data, switching rate and
consumer protection. Reforms to achieve liberalisation are summarised in table 5.
Table 5. Energy market reforms (Jamasb & Pollitt, 2005).
Restructuring -Vertical unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution, and retail supply activities
-Horizontal splitting of generation and retail supply
Competition and
Markets
-Wholesale market and retail competition.
-Allowing new entry into generation and retail supply
Regulation -Establishing an independent regulator
-Provision of third-party network access
-Incentive regulation of transmission and distribution networks
Ownership -Allowing new private actors
-Privatising the existing publicly owned businesses
The basic idea is that only generation and supplying electricity are to be profitable busi-
nesses. The rationale for market liberalisation derives from increased competition, effi-
cacy and innovation. Open markets are seen as a prerequisite for development of the sup-
ply and DR. Concern is that vertically integrated suppliers, who own both generation and
supply, do not have an incentive to offer energy efficiency and DR products because they
want high wholesale prices (Eurelectric, 2015b). On one hand, market liberalisation has
created new roles in the market, enabled new entrances and increased decentralised pro-
duction. It has increased the amount of strategic alliances and innovation networks. On
the other hand, it has also brought the guiding principle of profits and shareholder value
to the energy market (Verbong & Geels, 2007, p. 1031). As the electricity is mainly a
commodity business, in theory the strong players should have advantage in the market
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place and increase their market share. In practice, the results of market liberalisation have
been hard to predict and vary across countries (Gencer et al., 2017).
The implementation of the liberalisation means steering a systemic change, because ef-
fects of the change will affect every actor of the system. State will have less power to the
energy market as state-owned monopolies are privatised and an independent regulatory
authority is assessed. Markard and Truffer (2006) see market liberalisation as a funda-
mental change in the electricity innovation system. They see it has created a shift from
incremental and technology-oriented innovation more radical and customer-oriented
product innovations. More generators come as the grid access is authorised. Transmission
system operators’ (TSO) and DSOs’ role is to be neutral market facilitators. Customers
get more options of supply and pricing. (Jamasb & Pollitt, 2005)
Dynamic pricing
The biggest impact of market liberalisation for consumers is changed energy bill. If prices
reflected the actual scarcity, the prices would rise during times when the demand is high
and supply is low. Current dynamic pricing schemes do this in different ways. In static
Time-of-Use (ToU) pricing, the hourly prices are set beforehand with the help of overall
market prices during these times. ToU pricing can be adjusted to reflect seasonal changes,
daily changes or peak load. Critical Peak Pricing (CPP) is an event-based scheme in which
the price is increased for short periods. It is typically used for larger industrial customers.
In real-time pricing, the price is updated constantly and communicated to the consumer.
Dynamic pricing requires defining the price zones since demand, supply and grid conges-
tions happen in different geographical areas. This kind of system is called a nodal pricing
system (Jong et al., 2017, p. 19).
Implementation of dynamic pricing is a systemic change that affects people’s everyday
life and companies that implement it.  Consumers’ motivation for choosing dynamic pric-
ing and changing habits to save energy require understanding of the effects their actions
have. Therefore, consumers should be provided with clear information of the contracts
(Eurelectric, 2017). Smart meters and other automation is required to be in place at the
supplier and consumer. Suppliers need to adopt new ICT-based technologies and pro-
cesses. Dynamic pricing helps to follow consumers load profiles and can therefore reduce
retailers’ market hedging and revenues (SEDC 2016). Local pricing zones would create
better price signals for new investments but changes in the zoning also uncertainty (Jong
et al., 2017, p. 19).
The effect of liberalisation of the energy markets on energy prices is debatable when big
portion of the energy bill goes to taxes and surcharges. One of the rationales of liberali-
sation was to drive the prices down but different political supports combined to electricity
bills have diluted the effect the customer would otherwise would have seen. In fact, the
cost of energy itself has come down in average by 7 % between 2008 and 2014. The rise
of taxes and levies (+47%) and network charges (+18%) have actually increased the final
53
electricity bills of consumers (Eurelectric, 2015b). The household retail prices in the case
countries are shown in figure 17. Prices in Germany are one of the highest in Europe
alongside Denmark and Belgium, prices in other countries are lower (Eurostat, 2017).
Figure 17. Electricity price formation (own elaboration from Bourgault et al., 2016;
Energiavirasto, 2017; Eurelectric, 2015a; Eurostat, 2017; SIG, 2017).
High prices may hinder the electrification of transportation and heating sectors, which
reduces DR possibilities within their functions. On the other hand, high consumer prices
can drive energy efficiency and self-consumption as their profitability increases. Taxes
and network charges may become a driver for efficient use of energy in a grid-wise man-
ner if they are priced dynamically (Eurelectric 2017). However, keeping them as fixed
proportionate in the bill only reduces that kind of responsive effect.
In theory, market liberalisation should thrive innovation and new entrants to the market.
This has also been proven empirically as markets that were opened earlier have in average
more competition and customer engagement (ACER, 2015). It is a horizontal policy in-
strument, which enables innovation ecosystem to develop. It, however, requires informa-
tional policies alongside, so that consumers get better involved. The challenge is that sup-
port for RE has decreased wholesale prices and created difficulties for companies to pre-
dict the market. In that sense the policy has not been very coherent.
Approach of the European Union
Market liberalisation has been driven in the Electricity Market Directives of 1996, 2003
and 2009. These directives include rules like non-discriminatory grid access, designating
regulatory authority at national level and founding of ACER. Member states have had a
lot of freedom in implementing the measures (Barrett 2017). Alongside national market
liberalisation, the EU has pushed cross-border trading and transmission. Now it is forming
an Energy Union for harmonising the energy markets to a single European-wide energy
market (European Commission, 2017b). Mechanisms set to achieve this are: free entry to
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generation, unbundling TSOs and DSOs, funding new interconnections between coun-
tries, technical arrangements like cooperation in DSO-TSO levels and joint energy mar-
kets like the NordPool in Scandinavia and the Baltic countries.
Table 6. Market liberalisation in case countries.
Market liberalisation description Amount of generators and
suppliers (Eurelectric,
2015b)
Households
with dynamic
pricing (ACER,
2015, p. 27)
Source
IT Liberalised markets. High intercon-
nectivity and standard offers still dom-
inate market.
Main generation utilities: 3
Electricity retailers: 412
Over 75% have
ToU pricing.
(BEUC, 2016;
Cavasola &
Ciminelli, 2017)
FI Liberalised markets. Main generation utilities: 4;
Electricity retailers: 70
50-75% have
ToU pricing.
(Energy Market
Authority, 2016)
DE Fully liberalised, increasing competi-
tion, broad choice of offers.
Main generation utilities: 4;
Electricity retailers:  >1000
Under 25% have
ToU pricing.
(BEUC, 2016;
Eurelectric,
2015b)
FR Competition is open but EDF and its
subsidiaries own almost all generation,
transmission and distribution. Still reg-
ulated prices.
Main generation utilities: 1;
Electricity retailers: 183
50-75% have
ToU pricing; un-
der 25% have
CPP.
(CMS, 2015a)
CH Liberalisation undergoing, smallest
customers cannot choose supplier yet.
ElCom regulates fees.
Very fragmented electricity
market with over 900 utility
companies. 6 utilities own
80% of generation capacity.
N/A (CMS, 2015b)
4.1.2 Smart meters
Smart meters are “advanced meters that identify consumption in more detail than con-
ventional meters and communicate via a network back to the utility for monitoring and
billing purposes” (The Climate Group, 2008). They are replacing the old manually read
electricity meters. The concept of smart metering can be categorised to different technol-
ogies and terms. AMR (Automated Meter Reading) means that the utility can receive the
information from the meter from distance. The benefit is mainly that the utility gets the
billing information from distance and the information flow is only to the direction of the
utility (Rashed et al. 2014).  AMM (Automated Meter Management) means that infor-
mation flow is bidirectional so that distance control of the valves, for example, is possible.
AMI (Advanced Meter Infrastructure) is a larger entity of software and displays and sup-
plier business systems that measures, collects analyses and communicates the information
to all parties. AMI is regarded as an important building block of the smart grid infrastruc-
ture. (Zhou & Brown, 2017, p. 22; Barth et al., 2014, p. 20)
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Smart meters enable new pricing schemes for utilities and regulators. Before diffusion of
smart meters, real-time pricing was implemented only to industrial customers who could
participate to DR. Smart meters enable remote control of appliances, load limiting for DR
and communication with other intelligent devices. (Rashed et al. 2014) They can facilitate
more RE to the grid since they give more information to the DSOs on the fluctuations and
imbalances of the grid. For the early adopters of smart meters, the desired outcomes of
the smart meter rollout include reducing carbon emission, gaining competitive advantages
in the global market, increasing customer awareness and activity by more information
and simplified supplier switching processes (Zhou & Brown, 2017).
The challenges of the rollout lies in the constantly developing technology, unclear needs
and privacy issues. Smart meters have different standards caused by different strategic
interests of technology providers, utilities and governments. Some standards are open for
everybody, whereas choosing other standards means dependency on certain suppliers
(Erlinghagen et al., 2015, p. 1254). The first smart meters installed in 2001-2007, for
example in Italy, were based on proprietary standards, which have now a large installed
base. However, the new standards are more open and will probably gain bigger share of
future meters. Utilities have to analyse future needs of the grid and how advanced meters
they want to install. Reaching distant users and adding data exchange adds costs. The
average cost of delivering smart metering system is from €200 to €250 per customer
(European Commission, 2014a).
Implementation is usually done by DSOs who also take care of the metering. DSOs are
responsible to plan the functional requirements and communication standards within the
frames the governments choose (Erlinghagen et al. 2015). DSO remuneration regulation
is important factor in the smart meter diffusion, because the large financial burden of the
rollout. Regulation may include quality incentives that allow DSOs to raise network tar-
iffs.  Technology providers, like Sensus, Landis + Gyr, GE Energy and Elster, have nat-
urally a big role. These examples are either European or have manufacturing capacities
in Europe (Zhou & Brown, 2017).  The communication network ownership goes to either
the utilities or third party actors like mobile phone operators. Role of ICT sector will only
keep on growing in energy sector, which makes it a challenging environment for incum-
bent players. (Erlinghagen et al. 2015)
Some countries have chosen mandatory regulatory measures for smart meter rollout as
some countries have chosen partial or conditional policies. Naturally, the more binding
policies have been more effective (Zhou & Brown, 2017). Early adoption of smart meters
influences the pathway of technology development but includes also a risk of missing the
technical standards that are developed after the adoption. The speed of the rollout deter-
mines also the target group of the policy. Residential segment may need other policies to
support the rollout, such as information on the benefits of the new technology. For exam-
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ple, in Finland DSOs are obliged to provide customers in-home displays on their electric-
ity consumption. Social acceptance is dependent on the fears of privacy violations, in-
creased electricity bills and loss of control of electricity usage (Krishnamurti et al., 2012).
Approach of the European Union
Directive on the Internal Energy Market 2009/72/EC (European Union, 2009) says that
at least 80% of the consumers shall be equipped with intelligent metering systems by
2020.  The Clean Energy Package from 2016 states that  consumers who do not have a
smart meter should be able to have one when wanting to engage in dynamic pricing.(Eu-
ropean Commission, 2017b)
Table 7. Smart meter rollouts in case countries.
Smart meter rollout Operator Financing Source
IT 99% by 2020, first European country to do the
rollout.
DSO Network tariffs and
DSO resources
(Valles et al.,
2016)
FI 100% DSO DSO (Erlinghagen et
al., 2015)
DE Big consumers, new generation facilities. Ex-
pected diffusion rate by 2020 is 23 %. Finali-
sation for all consumers is expected in 2032.
Meter opera-
tor/DSO
Under study (Tews et al.,
2016; Valles et
al., 2016)
FR Rollout started in 2016, to be completed in
2021.
DSO, upon cus-
tomer’s agree-
ment
Network tariff (de l’Elpine,
2017; Valles et
al., 2016)
CH 80% by 2025 N/A N/A (EDNA, 2016)
4.2 Phases 2 and 3: Persuasion and Decision
4.2.1 Building codes
Renewing the building infrastructure is slow since only a couple percentages of buildings
are being renovated or rebuilt yearly. To accelerate the trend of energy efficient buildings,
regulation can impose building codes on lower energy consumption, zero energy build-
ings and energy audits. Challenge is to change the current paradigm of concentrating on
the up-front investment costs in the construction field (Berninger et al. 2017). Long pay-
back times of energy efficient solutions have not been attractive investments for custom-
ers  and  construction  companies  who already  struggle  with  high  upfront  costs.  Usually
construction companies are not responsible for the life-cycle costs of the houses. In addi-
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tion, energy efficient solutions require deep cooperation within actors in the project de-
velopment, which has not always been a common practice in the field. (Berninger et al.
2017)
Building codes address the potential issues RES have in buildings, such as, noise, visual
and environmental impacts. (Sawin & Flavin, 2006, p. 23) Some regulation makes sure
that buildings and infrastructure is suitable to the RES installations. Especially older
buildings are not designed so that there would be space for solar panels, water heaters or
charging equipment for EVs. The idea is that building codes affect the building construc-
tion phase and building materials.
Typically, the building codes set annual limits in energy usage. A downside of total con-
sumption measurements is that timing of the energy usage has no weight in the regulation,
which can hamper smart DR solutions. Sorri et al.  (2016) offer some practical examples
of building codes that has or could have an impact on DR. Regulation defining the read-
iness of buildings to accommodate DR could mean spaces for bigger boilers for heat stor-
age. Seasonal and peak-time power usage requirements would result in lower peak de-
mands. Timing energy use according to own production could be encouraged by synchro-
nising instructions. Power management inside the building could be steered towards
lower peak loads. (Sorri et al., 2016)
Building codes consist of a set of mandatory minimum energy performance requirements
designed to regulated energy use in buildings (IEA, 2013). In that sense, they are com-
mand-and-control type of policy instrument. There are also voluntary aspects in the build-
ing code regulation.
The implementation network is often complex because of the fragmentation and locality
of the construction industry. Level of implementation depends on the country but is usu-
ally done on the local level. (Berninger et al. 2017, ch. 3.2). Building permits are used
when builder or renovator is applying for building licence. Building project developers
can hire private experts in building inspections. On the macro level, standards are also an
object of battles between organisations. Naturally, they can be used to restrict technology
developments by unfavourable regulations. Different stakeholders who all have different
interests in the technological development are creating standards: technology providers,
users, complementors, standard development organisations, standard advocates and gov-
ernments (Markard & Erlinghagen, 2017). At worst situations, the construction and en-
ergy policies may be misaligned. (IEA, 2013, p. 11).
Approach of the European Union
Directive of Buildings’ Energy Efficiency 2010/31/EU sets that  new buildings that are
used and heated regularly should be so-called nZEBs (nearly Zero Energy Buildings) in
the near future. For public buildings this requirement starts in 2018 and other buildings
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in 2020. However, the directive leaves open questions of how much exactly of the con-
sumption has to be produced on-site and how much of it has to be RE (Talus et al. 2016).
Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU states that member states should renovate at
least 3% of buildings yearly and energy distributors and retailers should have 1,5 % sav-
ings by energy efficiency.
Table 8. Building codes related to prosumers in case countries.
Building codes and other requirements Source
IT Regions are responsible for building permits. All new buildings have to integrate
RES-E and RES-H. (e.g. 35 % of warm sanitary water, at least 2 kW for 100m2 house)
(Castello et al. 2015,
RES Legal, 2017)
(IEA, 2016b, p. 9)
FI No need for permits if the device does not affect environment or urban landscape
remarkably. Different coefficients for different primary energy sources.
(Finnish
government, 2017)
DE PV plants are a subject to building law but roof-mounted PVs do not require permis-
sion. Energy Conservation Regulations (EnEV).
(RES Legal, 2017;
Tews et al., 2016)
FR PV plants do require a notification but not a building permission. Réglementation
Thermique (RT): New buildings obliged to have RES-H; existing buildings have to
improve their efficiency until 2020.
(RES Legal, 2017;
Hespel 2015)
CH Cantonal duty. Usual installations do not require building permissions but notice to
municipality is necessary. Min. 20% of heat has to come from RE.
(OCEN 2013; IEA,
2015)
4.2.2 Labels and certificates
Standards and other product properties are informed to investors and consumers by dif-
ferent labels and certificates. Their aim is to promote energy efficiency and influence
property developers (IEA, 2013). Some governments can require labelling that indicates
how environmentally friendly products are or how much RES they use. They can be both
regulatory measures but in essential, they are informational policies, which allows con-
sumers to make better decisions. Their aim is to raise awareness and knowledge among
all stakeholders: consumers, developers and public procurement offices but also design-
ers, architects and other parties in the supply side. There is typically a highlighted dimen-
sion  in  a  product  or  a  service  that  is  otherwise  difficult  to  measure  or  estimate  by  the
consumer.
Certificates are important in industry growth by giving credibility and quality measures.
Finnish heat pump organisation SULPU is a good example of industry association that
was able to solve quality issues by installer and product certifications and training
(Berninger et al. 2017). Mir-Artigues and del Río (2016) say that densification of local
suppliers and installers, better training of the labour force and greater standardisation of
the systems can further reduce system prices. Labels and certificates facilitate the change
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in the market but do not guarantee any outcome and are therefore suitable as a comple-
mentary policy instrument. Implementing a certification or label scheme poses costs that
have to be allocated to public or private actors. (Shailendra et al., 2013)
The implementation of the labels and certificates affects all stakeholders in the product
supply chain as customers are integrating the label information in their purchase deci-
sions. This demand effect will then alter the up-stream supply chain by improving build-
ing materials and processes. After the building is registered and rated, there may also
rating on the usage of the building by measuring energy bills and meters. (EC-DG Energy,
2014)
Approach of the European Union
Directive 2010/31/EU of Energy Performance of Buildings mandates that the energy per-
formance rating is shown when selling or renting the house. In addition to houses, the
Eco-design Directive 2009/15/EC regulates the minimum energy performance and En-
ergy Labelling Directive 2010/30/ of products like refrigerators, air conditioning, light-
ening and vehicles. The Energy Performance Labels of building are implemented differ-
ently by the EU member states. The EU is developing a new sustainability performance
measures to value the full Life Cycle Assessment (European Commission, 2017a). The
Clean Energy Package includes voluntary smartness indicator, which informs on build-
ing’s capacity to use ICT to optimise operation with the grid (Council of the European
Union, 2017). Directive 2009/28/EU states that certification and qualification schemes
should be available for installers of different RES.
Table 9. Labels and certificates in case countries.
Labels and certificates Source
IT SEU certificate for RE systems; lowers general levies of the system. Installer train-
ing programmes and mandatory certificates. Energy Performance Building Certifi-
cate (2009), EPBD Energy Performance Certificate (2009), Passive House -
ZEPHIR (1990).
(Castello et al. 2015,
RES Legal, 2017)
(Dunlop & Roesch,
2016, p.89)
FI Voluntary certifications for installers and construction companies. Energy Perfor-
mance Certificate (2008), Nordic Ecolabel (Swan) (2009), Nearly Zero Energy
Buildings
(Finnish government,
2017; IEA, 2017a;
Lehto, 2016)
DE Big emphasis on safety regulation and certificates. PV plants require Solar
Keymark certificate. Trainings and obligatory registrations for self-employed in-
stallers. Passivhaus, Zukunft Haus: Energy performance certificate.
(Marzocchi, 2016, p.
28; RES Legal, 2017;
Tews et al., 2016)
FR A lot of effort in certificates and assessments due to building insurance policies.
Big Certisolis TC, CSTB, QualiPV Elec for electricians and QualiPV Bât for roof-
ers. Bâtiment Basse Consommation.
(de l’Elpine, 2017, p.31;
RES Legal, 2017)
CH CECB (Certificat énergétique cantonal des bâtiments), Minergie. (IEA, 2013)
60
4.2.3 Investment aids
Access to capital is often named as a big barrier for RE diffusion (e.g. Balcombe et al.,
2013, p. 658). Contrary to the conventional energy sources, high upfront costs with low
operational costs are typical for most RES. Once the initial investment is done, the system
produces energy with very low operational costs. Same logic works for heating, energy
efficiency and EVs. Alternative business models like leasing and contracting are increas-
ingly introduced to the market. Possible financing methods are summarised in table 10.
As the technology is still relatively new to many financial partners, RES are often re-
garded as a “new asset classes” by the banks. Spreading knowledge is one way of reduc-
ing the high upfront costs of RES. (Overholm, 2015)
Table 10. Funding possibilities (Mir-Artigues & del Río, 2016).
Origin of funds Modality Residential Non-residential
Self-financing Cash Own savings Internal funds
Debt Bank loans, home loans, specific loans Bank loans
Third-party fi-
nancing
Lease Operating lease Operating lease
PPA  n.a. Service contract
Tax incentives
Tax incentives can include tax credits and reductions to sales taxes and VAT. Taxation
can also be used for property tax exemptions. Benefits as a policy instrument are related
to the price signals they create to customers and obviation of governmental regulatory
decisions. Tax reductions also allow governments to set limits on the amount they spend
on the policy. The weaknesses of tax incentives is possibility of free riders who would do
the investment decision anyway, incapability to decrease consumption and the fact that
their effect on creating technology diffusion cannot be guaranteed because actual demand
might not be increased. In addition, they have to be devoted to certain technologies and
in that sense politics will be picking the winners. (Carley, 2011)
Grants
Grants are monetary assists provided by the government that do not have to be repaid.
Usually there are conditions, like battery storage or DR applications on getting the grant
like fulfilling certain standards. Sometimes they are used to allow banks to offer low-
interest loans for RE systems. For the consumer, grants are simple and transparent.
(IRENA, 2012; Tews et al., 2016) Downside is that the subsidy amount may increase
prices. The subsidy can be calculated as a proportion of the cost or the capacity of the
system installed and there may be a limit on the total support given.
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Soft loans
Usually residential prosumers take a loan in combination of 20-40% share of their own
equity.  Loans may be connected to the FITs if they exist but normally they are just con-
ventional loans with interest rate of 3-7%. Countries can guarantee low interest loans for
RE investments when the interest rate can drop to 1-2% (Mir-Artigues & del Río, 2016).
In addition, government loan guarantees can reduce financial risk and therefore lower the
interest rate. This effect can be more seen in bigger investments. In developed countries,
the loan possibilities are relatively good, but capital costs still vary a lot between coun-
tries. In developing countries, microfinance is an important tool.
These instruments are not mutually exclusive but often work as combined policies. Fi-
nancial instruments at the investment phase have been categorised as secondary instru-
ments (Mir-Artigues & del Río, 2016, p.275). Their effectiveness and success has been
tied to primary instruments, like FITs. Now that the prices of RES have come down, they
are connected to other complementary policies like information and regulatory measures.
The effect of subsidising the investment itself may be effective especially in the circum-
stances where profits of the use are uncertain. Subsidies that are paid straight on the pur-
chase are seen more efficient and easier for the dealer. (Bauner & Crago, 2015). They are
also safer for the government as future electricity market and technology cost trends are
less important than with subsidies that apply at the use phase. In addition, subsidising the
investment does not affect the market as much as production subsidies.
Direct subsidies and tax exemptions require technology choosing from the government,
which they are not perhaps willing to do. On the other hand, they enable supporting cer-
tain technology combinations. Current trend is that solar PV is bought in combination
with other services or technologies like smart thermostats or energy storage (Dunlop &
Roesch, 2016, p. 38). However, controlling the business models by supporting certain
solutions may hinder innovativeness and long-term contracts with energy service compa-
nies (ESCOs). For example, targeting tenants, housing companies or leasing firms de-
mands different designs. Rebound effects, like reduced demand and prices for fossil fuels
should also be considered (Carley, 2011, p. 278). National government can implement
grants but more often, they are applied on the lower governmental levels like regions or
municipalities. Taxing is state-level competence.
Approach of the European Union
Member states have freedom to choose how they implement the investment subsidies, but
they have to be accepted by the EU. The EU strives for reducing market distortions and
creating level playing field for all technologies (European Commission, 2017b, p. 11).
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Table 11. Financial support for investment in case countries.
Grant Soft loans Tax reductions Source
IT Capital subsidies differ re-
gionally.
N/A Reduced VAT of 10% in-
stead of 20% and reduced
real estate tax of 0,4%.
(Castello et al.
2015; RES
Legal, 2017)
FI No grants for residential in-
stallations.
Can be financed with
home loans, rates 0-2 %.
45 % tax reduction from
the work component when
installation done as retro-
fit to existing buildings.
(Ahola, 2015;
Motiva, 2017)
DE 30 % grants from KfW-bank
with requirement for a storage
system or DSM-enabling
technology.
Loan programs from 1 %
annual interests connected
to battery incentives from
KfW bank.
N/A (Tews et al.,
2016)
FR Grant of 400€-300€/kWp for
self.-consumption installa-
tion.
Many commercial possi-
bilities.
Materials have decreased
10 % VAT
(EcoInfos, 2017)
CH Up to 30 % of installation
cost, 500 CHF/kWp. Imple-
mentation varies between
cantons, e.g. Genève offers
1200 CHF + CHF 500/kW for
solar panels.
Usually financed by in-
creasing mortgages: inter-
est rate: 0,8%-1,5%.
N/A (Canton de
Geneve, 2017;
Hüsser, 2016)
4.2.4 Third party ownership
McKinsey counts that service-related costs like financing, customer acquisition, regula-
tory incentives and approvals represent half of the expenses US customers paid in 2014
(Frankel et al. 2014). The shares in the case countries are shown in figure 18. It is clear
that bringing these costs down have still potential to reduce to total costs of solar PV.
Figure 18. Solar investment cost break-down in case countries  (Ahola, 2015; Altenhöfer-
Pflaum, 2014; Castello et al., 2015; Hüsser, 2016 ).
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Policies can encourage other financing and ownership models that address these problems
(Berninger et al. 2017). Juntunen and Hyysalo (2015) say ownership models can be di-
vided into local ownership at the production site or ownership outside the site. In devel-
oped countries, the traditional on-site ownership is normal. Third-party ownership (TPO)
and financing model, shown in figure 19, is popular especially in the US markets. Idea is
that solar service company plans, installs, owns and maintains PV systems for the cus-
tomer and takes care of the financing.  These TPO contracts include Power Purchase
Agreements (PPA) like fee-for-service contracts or leasing possibilities like “rent-a-roof”
contracts. In PPA model, the system and installation is free for the consumer but he pays
a monthly bill that the developer uses to finance its business. They have different payment
structures that are fixed or they can vary according the production. In some contracts, the
consumer can purchase the system after certain period. Leasing contracts are common in
car industry and office equipment. In them customer pays also a monthly fee for the sys-
tem and not the production. Similar kinds of models are used by ESCOs in the field of
energy efficiency and DR (Berninger et al 2017).
Figure 19. Financial flows in TPO models (Strupeit & Palm, 2016).
Benefit of the business model comes from the easiness of the service, which makes TPO
models attractive to customers who are less engaged to the process and have less dispos-
able income. TPO models decrease the complexity and risks of the investment, decrease
upfront costs and effort on permitting and maintenance of the system. On the other hand,
this  efficiency  is  formed by  learning  efforts  of  whole  business  ecosystem that  is  often
based on current technologies likes solar, and can in that way form lock-ins regarding
other innovations like DR. Good financing conditions require often proven track record
of successful projects which means use of the same technology also in the future.
(Overholm, 2015)
TPO models have not diffused to Europe as they have in the US, which can be explained
partly with policies.  TPO companies in the US have had often close relationships with
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regulators and utilities, which has ensured transparent processes and stable regulatory
framework (Overholm, 2015). TPO companies should be able to work legitimately with-
out having to be classified as a utility. Other reasons are related to FIT system and financ-
ing possibilities. In the US, success of leasing and PPA contracts is based on tax credits
and accelerated depreciation for solar assets, which bigger companies benefit from. To
reach these benefits the service provider has to have large customer base, which forms
also an entry barrier to the market. Electricity rate structure and level, and relatively high
transaction costs of permitting, which is done more efficiently by companies than indi-
viduals, are other reasons for success. In addition, weak possibilities to get low-interest
loans can push people to use TPO business models. (Strupeit & Palm, 2016)  Possible
barriers to TPO contracts come from national property regulation that need to allow fixed
assets in privately owned property. Issues like responsibilities for damages and mortgage
loan conditions have to be sorted out. In addition, leasing contracts may become difficult
when the tenant of homeowner moves. (SolarPowerEurope, 2015)
Approach of the European Union
The Electricity Directive 2009/72/EU states that electricity markets should be open to all
market participants and people should be able to choose their suppliers freely. Third par-
ties should have similar rules to access the grid. In the Energy Efficiency Directive, the
EU encourages municipalities to use integrated  energy performance contracts and devel-
oping market for energy services (European Union, 2012).
Table 12. Third party ownership in case countries.
Third party ownership models Source
IT Allowed but with conditions for net metering program ‘Scambio sul Posto’ (IEA-PVPS, 2016)
FI  3rd Party ownership possible and several funding options available. PPAs,
crowdfunding, renting with fixed prices. Some utilities provide financing for
panels.
(Ahola, 2015)
DE PPAs authorised but not common in residential market. (Dunlop & Roesch, 2016;
Strupeit & Palm, 2016)
FR Legal framework uncertain. Used in commercial and industrial sectors. Leasing
is a common instrument with own Energy Financing Company Sofergies.
(de l’Elpine, 2017)
CH Practically not existing in Switzerland. (Hüsser, 2016)
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4.3 Phase 4: Implementation
4.3.1 Interconnection rules and costs
Issues regarding the grid connection include permission to interconnect, system size lim-
itations, bureaucracy process, delay times and cost allocation of the reviewing, connec-
tions and grid upgrades. Grid connection rules are seen as efficient complementary regu-
lation that supports prosumer diffusion. (Tews et al., 2016; Barth et al. 2014)  It is com-
mand-and-control type of regulation that can be either horizontal or technology specific.
In principle, all parties should have equal possibilities to interconnect and participate in
the market but increasing interconnections require new kind of grid planning on the
TSO/DSO level. Grid connection rules are in a way an indication of the openness of the
energy market. Grid connection is guaranteed by legislation in some countries, which
means that the DSOs have obligation to connect DERs to network. There may be also
requirements for the grid operator to communicate the timetable of permitting, costs and
compatibility checks. Priority dispatch is a mandate that RE supplies are integrated into
energy systems before supplies from other sources (IRENA, 2012). There can be also
solar or wind maps available that tell where it is easiest and most clever to install RES
(IEA, 2014, p. 67).
In some countries, the costs of grid connection and applications are allocated to prosumer
either fully or partly. This is often determined by the capacity that is being installed by
the prosumer. In a way, it is prosumer’s contribution to network’s stability. If prosumer
can reduce the peak production load to network by self-consumption, the grid fee may
also be reduced. (Mir-Artigues & del Río, 2016) In some countries, a legislation guaran-
tees that the connection is done for free or it is at least partly recovered for the prosumer.
In addition, the grid extension costs have to be taken into account. They can be tricky to
allocate to a few prosumers because strengthening the grid benefits other ratepayers too.
Even though prosumers get a guaranteed connection to the grid, the obligation to buy
electricity does not necessarily exist. If there is not a purchase obligation, prosumer has
to find a retailer to whom to sell the electricity. Finding a retailer is not usually a problem
but the price the utility will pay might differ from one company to another.
Desired outcomes of grid connection rules are cost efficiency and short delays. When the
market is new and there are no rules regarding the interconnection, the evaluation of every
project is long and technical requirements are not streamlined and standardised. Even if
there are laws that require energy companies to do the interconnection, there is not nec-
essarily the experience to do it. As the industry is still relatively young in many places in
Europe, the interconnection experiences and capabilities vary a lot also between munici-
palities and regions. (Olkkonen et al. 2016) In some countries, the interconnection proce-
dure may be only a quick check that everything is appropriately done whereas in some
countries the costs and delay times may become a barrier for prosuming. These issues
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are, however, more common in commercial and industrial segments than residential seg-
ment (Barth et al. 2014). Interconnection rules are important facilitator for further
prosumer diffusion because perceived difficulty of the investment is often a barrier in the
later adopter segments. Simplicity is often very important to big majority of consumers.
If the procedure is difficult, the value and role of TPO solutions rise like happened in the
US (Strupeit & Palm, 2016). The priority dispatch encourage developing the electricity
system but may also lead to higher system costs (Jong et al., 2017, p. 22).
Approach of the European Union
Before the Clean Energy Package in November 2016, The European Union mentions pri-
ority dispatch of RES as a desirable option. Now the European Commission proposes to
end priority dispatch for producers of over 500 kW capacities, which therefore does not
affect residential prosumers. Article 12 states that grid should be planned so that maxi-
mum 5 % of RES is curtailed. The 2009 Renewable Energy Directive  (RED) says that
small customers should be ensured a simplified and less burdensome authorisation pro-
cedures (European Commission, 2009).
Table 13. Interconnection rules in case countries.
Interconnection procedure Cost allocation Source
IT Hassle free priority grid access with little delays.
Some local authorities may apply own rules and de-
lay permission. DSO must connect the plant within
30 day.
Upgrade costs recovered from
network costs.
(BEUC, 2016; RES
Legal, 2017)
FI Law does not regulate the grid connection procedure
so it depends on the DSO. No timeframe but unrea-
sonable delays are covered (max €3000). Non-dis-
criminatory criteria but no priority access.
Grid  operator  can  ask  a  rea-
sonable price for the connec-
tion but is not obliged to pay
for grid upgrades.
(Ahola, 2015; RES
Legal, 2017)
DE Hassle free priority grid access and purchase. Grid
operator is obliged to offer the installations without
delay. Only 70% of capacity can be fed into grid or
the system has to be also remotely curtailable.
Upgrade costs recovered from
network costs.
(BEUC, 2016;
Tews et al., 2016)
FR Grid operator has to deliver connection plan in 6
weeks  and  installation  after  2  months  of  the  ac-
ceptance. (18 months for bigger) Unclear if there will
be a limit for SC systems.
Connection costs approxi-
mately 180€/kW. Exceptoin
form Linky smart meters.
Plant owner pays grid exten-
sions.
(Courtel 2017;
Kaaijk & Durand
2016; RES Legal
2017)
CH Grid operator checks the connection in 30 days. Non-
discriminatory criteria but no priority access. Differ-
ences depending the DSO.
The costs for grid connection
are borne by the energy sup-
plier.
(RES Legal, 2017)
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4.3.2 Indirect benefit from self-consumption
Self-consumption (SC) has become more and more popular way of integrating RES to
the grid as the costs of RES have reached grid parity in several countries. The financial
benefit of SC comes from savings in the electricity bill. The retail price of electricity is
formed of three components: electricity, taxes and network costs, which all entail about
one third of the bill (Eurelectric, 2015a). Electricity part includes the production in power
plants,  trading  and  selling  to  customers  and  the  customer  service  of  utilities.  Network
costs are the transport costs, which cover the costs of delivery of electricity to homes and
construction and maintenance of power lines and other infrastructure to do it. Rest of the
bill includes taxes and other levies like RE support costs or support for vulnerable cus-
tomers. In countries like Germany and Denmark, which have introduced a lot of RE, this
part is relatively bigger than in other countries (Eurelectric, 2015b).
In many countries, the excess electricity fed into the grid gains only the wholesale price,
which is often not enough to be financially attractive. In some cases, there can be a feed-
in premium or tariff but the levels of them have come down during last years. In addition,
a limit on the amount of electricity fed to the grid may reduce system sizes. The SC rates
for residential homes are usually around 30 % depending on country (Keles et al., 2015).
The change of the business case from FITs to SC is illustrated in figure 20. The line A
refers to the difference between levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) price of the own
production and the retail price of electricity. The line B refers to the difference between
the LCOE price of own production and the FIT price, which is set to be slightly higher
than the LCOE price. For example in Germany’s case, prosumer self-consuming saves
the 29 cents of retail price by SC but on the other hand loses the FIT of 12 cents. Remain-
ing 17 cents resembles the net benefit the prosumer gains. Since network tariff formation
and taxation are the cornerstones of profitability of the SC model, they are studied more
in detail in the following chapters.
Figure 20. Change from FIT remuneration to SC business model (Schill et al. 2017).
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The aim and tools of SC are debatable. SC is a better solution for grid stability than FIT
or net metering. Most importantly, SC is a driver of flexibility that is well aligned with
DR, battery storage and other smart solutions (European Commission, 2015). However,
some point that the SC rate should be maximised whereas others highlight the importance
of prosumer’s activity in the market. According to BEUC (2016) “isolated system”, like
houses with high SC rate, would not provide that. In addition, the decreases in tax reve-
nues and network charges cause problems for DSOs and the state.
Network tariffs
Increasing amounts of smart appliances, storage, EVs and microgeneration are reasons
network tariffs are being now re-designed or re-evaluated in Europe (CEER, 2017). As
RE has a decentralised nature, the emphasis is moving away from a grid serving only
unidirectional electricity flows. As prosumers produce their own energy, less grid is used
but fluctuations increase. With volume-based network tariffs, prosumers pay less network
charges than regular consumers do. However, prosumers use the grid as back up because
going off-grid requires very big capacities of storage. Independency from the grid is a
possible future in some areas when battery price get down (Baker et al. 2016). In this
sense, there is a possibility of so called “death spiral” for utilities if no structural changes
are done (IEA 2014). Although there are concerns of this phenomenon within utilities,
some policy makers address that small changes in ratemaking can answer it.
Objectives of ratemaking can be divided into sustainability, economic efficiency and pro-
tection principles (AF - Mercados EMI 2015). According to CEER (2017) the general
objective of rate planning is to achieve cost reflectivity, non-distortion for innovative so-
lutions, cost recovery for DSOs, non-discriminatory for different kinds of consumers,
transparency, predictability and simplicity.
Most European countries have still volume-based tariffs at the distribution level, but some
countries, like Spain and the Netherlands have shifted into capacity-based charges
(CEPA, 2017). The benefit of capacity-based tariffs is that they reflect well the actual
network costs, which are derived from the peak demand requirements. The disadvantage
of them is that they do not encourage energy efficiency and punish low consumption hous
eholds. As a solution, some countries have introduced hybrid pricing that take both, vol-
ume (€/kWh) and capacity (€/kW) into account. Also a fixed charge (€/period) or dy-
namic pricing schemes are possible. The more the network component remains fixed, the
more the incentive to react to the market supply weakens. (Picciariello et al. 2015; Valles
et al. 2016) Different rate options are listed in table 14.
69
Table 14. Different ways of charging network costs (CEER, 2017).
Tariff struc-
ture Explanation Advantage Disadvantage
Fixed charge
or contracted
capacity
charges
DSO determines certain fixed level
that can be based on e.g. installed ca-
pacity. (€/day; €/month; €/year)
Simple, stable and pre-
dictable. Can signal ca-
pacity costs.
No signals of long-term
costs. Does not encourage
energy efficiency.
Capacity
usage based
tariff
Charged retrospectively according to
highest used capacity.
Incentivises lower peak
power usages.
Does not encourage lowering
energy consumption. Bad for
SC business models.
Energy usage
based tariffs
Relative to the energy taken from the
grid. Also called volumetric tariff.
(€/kWh)
Acceptability of consum-
ers. Encourages energy
efficiency.
Uncertain revenue for DSOs.
Does not reflect always the
system peaks.
Static ToU
tariffs
Certain hours have higher charges
according predicted peak hours of
the network.
Makes planning of flexi-
bility easy.
Don't take into account inter-
mittent RE production, use of
storage and DR.
Dynamic ToU
tariffs
 Price bands can change on day-to-
day  basis  or  more  frequently  to  re-
flect e.g. very hot or cold days.
System benefits. SC and
storage to avoid peak
hours.
Risk of simultaneous re-
sponses, e.g. with EVs.
Interruptible
tariffs
DSO can interrupt system usage of
its customers for security and system
reasons. Used for e.g. electric heaters
or freezers.
Easy to invoice, predict
and compare flexibility
options.
Does not encourage decreas-
ing energy consumption or
peak usage.
The profitability of the SC model depends heavily on the network tariffs. Yet, there has
to be a systemic approach on the tariff design because they also affect the network and
different technologies. In fact, the same incentives that influence prosuming patterns may
have an opposite effect on the network system. The combined price signals from higher
network tariff and lower electricity price may eradicate each other’s effect. For example,
low wholesale prices during sunny days may incentivise to load batteries and EVs, but
also congest the grids. Cost reflectivity is therefore important for sustainable grid devel-
opment.
Capacity-based tariffs can encourage battery investments that can lower the peak demand.
Solar PV would be installed to reduce to peak consumption and home appliances would
be controlled so that, for example washing machines and electric saunas are not on at the
same time. On the other hand, EVs and DR require high capacities if they are to be a fully
used as flexibility resources (Honkapuro et al. 2017, pp.45-52). Implementing different
prosumer market models like peer-to-peer, prosumer-to-grid and prosumer community
models (Parag & Sovacool 2016) require certain amount of interconnections between
prosumers, which means that minimising capacities is perhaps not the optimal solution.
Another issue that has to be thought is public acceptance of the changes. Cross-subsidi-
sation effect happens when more of these costs are allocated to non-prosumers.
The implementation network normally consists of European-level directives, the local
energy regulator, DSOs and end-users. Regulators create a regulatory framework accord-
ing to the European directives that NRAs implement for the DSOs. In some countries,
DSOs can decide the tariff structure themselves. Remuneration regulation of electricity
distribution for the DSOs is the other side of the issue. Regulating DSOs is a regulatory
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issue because DSOs are natural monopolies. In practise, NRAs follow how much network
operator gets revenues. Allowing and incentivising them to be innovative on DR and stor-
age, for example, depends on the regulation. Valles et al. (2016) suggest profit sharing
schemes as well as accelerated depreciations and longer regulatory periods for new frame-
work.
Network tariffs create conditions in the whole electricity system and are therefore tech-
nology-neutral. Even though the rules may be same for all technologies, the way of im-
plementing the network tariffs affects how the prosumer ecosystem will shaped up since
it will support other technologies more than others. This policy should be accompanied
with information policy instruments because consumer do not necessarily understand the
effect of different appliances on the peak demand.
Approach of the European Union
Directive 2012/27/EU of Energy Efficiency Directive states: “Network tariffs shall be
cost-reflective of cost-savings in networks achieved from demand-side and DR measures
and distributed generation, including savings from lowering the costs of delivery or of
network investment and a more optimal operation of the network”. (European Union,
2012)
Table 15. Network tariff regulation regarding self-consumption.
Taxes and levies
Energy  has  always  been  an  efficient  way  of  collecting  taxes  and  on  the  same  time  to
controlling energy consumption and incentivising energy efficiency. Now that the energy
Network tariffs Self-consumption costs Source
IT Fixed + capacity (34 %) + energy (66
%); Nationally almost uniform. Tradi-
tion of having progressively increasing
energy part. Change towards capacity
and fixed pricing.
Under 20 kW systems’ self-genera-
tion exempted from grid costs. Big-
ger gradually exempted. Small fee
of 15-45 € depending on system size
to cover management and control.
(Veum et al., 2016; AF-
Mercados EMI, 2015, p.
114; CEPA, 2017)
FI Fixed (50%) + energy (50%); Depends
on the DSO.
No grid tariffs on SC. (AF-Mercados EMI, 2015;
Energiavirasto, 2017)
DE Fixed (20%) + energy (80%); each DSO
sets own tariffs.
No grid tariffs on SC. (Tews et al., 2016; Valles et
al., 2016; Veum et al.,
2016)
FR Fixed (6 %) + capacity (14 %) + energy
(80 %); Nationwide uniform; voltage
and optional TOU
No grid tariffs for SC. (EcoInfos, 2017; Valles et
al., 2016)
CH Volumetric tariffs. No grid tariffs on SC. (Hüsser, 2016; SIG, 2017)
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field is in transition, also ways to tax it are under changes. Besides taxes, consumers pay
surcharges for RE support in some countries. Other surcharges include RES and CHP
premiums, nuclear decommissioning, support for vulnerable consumers, energy effi-
ciency support, security of supply surcharges and many other fees. Usually industrial
electricity consumers are exempted from them, which increases the burden on residential
consumers. (Eurelectric, 2014)
The needs for updating the energy taxation and collecting levies arise from three reasons:
decrease of demand and incentivising flexibility and energy storage. Firstly, taxes and
surcharges are often carried out as fixed €/kWh consumed, which means that self-con-
sumption as well as energy efficiency decrease state’s tax revenue. The revenue loss is
even bigger when the RE subsidies, like FITs, are funded from electricity charges. Prof-
itability of self-consumption business model is dependent on the tax level consumers and
prosumers pay. This cross-subsidisation issue has arisen debate in Germany on the social
acceptability and affordability of the whole energy transition (Tews et al., 2016). The FIT
model does not have this issue because it does not decrease energy consumption. In some
cases  also  the  FIT is  taxed  as  revenue  (IEA,  2014,  pp.  47-51).  On the  other  hand,  the
investor of a self-generation has paid taxes while buying the equipment and installation
(SolarPowerEurope, 2015). Secondly, the fixed €/kWh does not incentivise DR. The
amount of taxes is kept the same no matter what the price of the energy component is.
Thirdly, energy storing is not currently taken into account in the taxation and may be
taxed twice, both when storing electricity from the grid and when feeding electricity back
to the grid. Storing energy is different from normal usage of energy and it can be used for
adding flexibility to the grid in many ways.
The Value Added Tax (VAT) is another issue that has to be taken into account. For con-
sumed energy, it is paid as a percentage of the energy cost. Common options for electric-
ity tax reform are roughly: fixed €/kWh and fixed percentage of market price. One option
is to carry the taxes as a fixed charge monthly or annually (Pérez-Arriaga & Knitte, 2016,
p.117).  The benefit  of this solution would be that it  does not distort  short-term market
signals. However, equal sum to all consumers would not be fair to less-consuming people.
In addition, high share of fixed part of taxes and levies in the electricity bill hinders DR
and the development of energy storing.
If the tax would be counted as a percentage from the energy bill like the VAT is, the
fluctuation of retail price would increase and encourage storing and DR activities. For
example, a 40% tax on electricity price would mean that consumer’s tax payment is
∂ 4€/MWh, when electricity is 10€/MWh
∂ 20€/MWh, when electricity is 50€/MWh
∂ 80€/MWh, when electricity is 200€/MWh (Smart Energy Transition, 2017)
VAT on the self-consumed electricity is another issue. Usually small residential prosum-
ers are not obliged to pay VAT on their electricity production but bigger installations it
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may affect and this affects collective self-consumption. In general, products that are made
only for own use are however often exempted from VAT. There are also exempts on
small-scale businesses that are not regarded as main businesses for the owners. Factor
that can affect the VAT rules lies also in how the investment is shared and what is the
individual investment and revenues. (Talus et al. 2016) If the self-produced electricity is
due to VAT, the profitability of the investment can change dramatically. On the other
hand, the exemptions on VAT in the purchase and installation phase saves money that the
prosumer can invest elsewhere immediately. In 2013, there was a case in Austria which
feeding excess electricity to the grid was regarded as economic activity and therefore
VAT duties. The European Court of Justice decided that he was obliged to calculate VAT
output of his production but on the other hand could exempt the VAT from the plant
procurement. (Talus et al. 2016)
These kinds of measures are possible in creating conditions for more flexible usage of
electricity. However, their political acceptability is questionable and therefore hindering
the change. Questions that remain to be answered include: How the change will affect
different consumer segments? Which price level the tax would be linked? How the total
the tax is designed so that total tax burden does not increase or decrease too much? (TEM,
2017)
Approach of the European Union
Electricity taxes are harmonised by the EU but member states have freedom to implement
their own taxes. Directive 2003/96/EU states that taxes should not distort competition or
the single market (European Union, 2003). It sets a minimum tax level of 1,0 €/MWh for
residential use. In practice, member states apply much higher taxes for electricity. In ad-
dition, there does not seem to exist barriers of implementing a %-based tax (Borenius,
2017).
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Table 16. Taxes and levies related to self-consumption in case countries.
Retail bill SC taxes and levies Source
IT Consumer taxes and levies 9,2 €c/kWh.
Levies volumetric for residential con-
sumers but partly fixed for non-residen-
tial users.
Charges for systems above 20 kW. (Valles et al.,
2016; Veum et
al., 2016;)
FI Consumer taxes and levies 5,3 €c/kWh.
RE surcharge from state budget, does not
affect electricity prices directly.
Generation less than 100 kVA is liberated
from electricity tax. Owning PV system
isn’t regarded as business activity but the
income from surplus electricity regarded as
personal income
(Ahola, 2015;
Eurostat, 2017)
DE Consumer taxes and levies 16 €c/kWh.
All consumers pay 6,9 €/kWh surcharge
for RES.
EEG surcharge of 40 % for installations
over 10 kW. No taxes on SC.
(Tews et al.,
2016; Valles et
al., 2016; Veum
et al., 2016)
FR Consumer taxes and levies 6,1 €c/kWh.  No taxes on SC. FIT revenue not taxed (Valles et al.,
2016)
CH Consumer taxes and levies 4,3 €c/kWh.
All consumers pay little 0,013 CHF/kWh
surcharge for RES.
No taxes or charges on SC (Hüsser, 2016)
4.3.3 Collective self-consumption
Peer-to-peer market means that prosumer is selling directly to another customer without
the utility in the middle. Theoretically, it means that people share part of their own hard-
ware and information for a common purpose. Usually this means so-called “over-the-
fence usage of production prosumers can sell their production to nearby consumers in
multi-apartment blocks or shopping centres.  This framework is especially useful for
apartments and tenants because now they face difficulties in getting active in prosuming
markets (Veum et al., 2016). Problem is that joint production site of a building may have
to use the common grid before being used. In this way, the consumers in the apartments
have to pay the taxes and network fees.
Allowing collective SC means a set of regulatory measures. Usually prosumer has to be
one legal person and the SC has to be done close to the production. Important factor is
whether the limit is the apartment or the connection to distribution system. The size of
the installation, community and how many persons it includes may affect the amount of
taxes to be paid for the electricity they produce onsite (Talus et al. 2016). Other questions
lie in (1.) Is there a possibility for habitants to view the metering data? (2.) Can the utility
offer and charge for the billing and metering services? (FinSolar, 2017) and (3.) Is the
producer also a ‘supplier’ of electricity with obligations of suppliers? In addition, adding
a storage to the system is not discussed in current regulation (Courtel, 2017). Housing
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company acts should be taken into account and participants should also have an option
not to participate (TEM, 2017, p. 35).
Aim of legalising collective SC is to unlock this investment potential for RES for multi-
apartment houses and tenants. Allowing joint ownerships of SC plants also allows opti-
mising the location, maintenance and use. (Talus et al., 2016) It would open new service
business models for smart micro grids. In addition, it would reduce the cross-subsidisation
effect between residential prosumers and ordinary consumers who have not had a chance
to become prosumers earlier. Distance between the use and generation determines how
profitable the scheme is for the prosumer and the utility. With longer distance, the benefits
for the utility diminish but SC rates can increase for the prosumer.  On the other hand,
collective SC reduces revenues from network costs. In addition, people living in more
dispersed areas would not have the same possibility and their relative proportion of net-
work costs would increase.
As a more radical market formation, peer-to-peer markets get independent from the gird
by a bottom-up movement. (Parag & Sovacool, 2016) These marketplaces have a resem-
blance of sharing economy platforms like Airbnb or Uber by creating a virtual grid and
trading electricity among the community members. It forms a market place where
prosumers and consumers can directly sell and buy electricity and other services and in
this way cutting the utility from the value chain. The market may include long-term con-
tractual relations between players. One part might generate while other party stores the
energy. If these markets form autonomous units, the question of responsible of security
of supply arises. The blockchain technology is already used to handle transactions in such
microgrids (Hasse et al., 2016).
Creating collective SC is a change that affects a wide network of actors. DSO and a pos-
sible third party would organise the metering so that it is possible to meter apartment-
level and community-level prosumption and consumption. Information delivery and man-
agement are important pre-requisites for this because inhabitants may have several dif-
ferent retailers. Use of data hub for this should be discussed. In addition, real estate mar-
ket,  building  codes  as  well  as  housing  company acts  set  framework  for  collective  SC.
(TEM, 2017).
Approach of the European Union
The Clean Energy Package requires Member states to ensure that prosumers can partici-
pate in the energy markets through local energy communities, which are protected to
compete against large-scale players (European Commission, 2017b). A closed distribu-
tion system is possible for industrial  areas,  for example,  but usually not for residential
areas (European Union, 2009). European Commission has approved a feed-in premium
for a joint PV installation in Denmark, which several different housing communities built
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together. Assumption was made that the PV installation di not exceed 6 kW per house-
hold. Therefore, it can be assumed that EU legislation approves support for joint cooper-
atives (Talus et al. 2016).
Table 17. Collective self-consumption and peer-to-peer possibilities in case countries.
Description of regulatory framework Source
IT Not yet common in residential sector but promising possibilities in the scheme SEU
(Sistema Efficienti die Utenza) having similar tax incentives as for residential solar.
(Dunlop & Roesch,
2016)
FI No established legislation. Unclear points: taxes, availability of consumption data,
can DSO take a fee for the service,
(FinSolar, 2017)
DE Direct delivery to nearby consumer without using the grid is allowed. The prosumer
can choose if he will use the grid or sell the energy directly with bidirectional meter.
(Veum et al., 2016)
FR Legislation for collective SC came in 2017 into force. Producers and consumers
have to be part of a same legal entity, but the type of entity is free. Installation cannot
exceed 100 kW. Network tariff levels are still unclear.
(Courtel, 2017)
CH Collective SC is part of new Energy strategy 2050 and under discussion. Now, col-
lective SC is possible in apartments.
(AEM, 2016;
Romande Energie SA,
2016)
4.3.4 Compensation for electricity fed into the grid
Mostly the excess production is remunerated by the wholesale price, which reflects the
value of energy in the electricity system. The final remuneration is typically negotiated
private PPAs. They are sales contracts between two parties where contract lengths, prices
and contract structure vary (Dunlop & Roesch, 2016, p. 90). However, the remuneration
can be also done by net billing or other measures which can be adjusted to different prices
and charges.(Mir-Artigues & del Río, 2016) Timing of the production and usage comes
more and more important in the future as flexible pricing can change the old paradigm of
fixed energy prices. This will be taken into account while installing the RES at home by
facing the solar panels towards east or west. Suddenly not only southern façade is im-
portant. For example, in South Africa the remuneration of energy producers is increased
by factor 2.7 for the period between 16.30-21.30. (Mir-Artigues & del Río 2016; IEA
2016)
Feed-in tariffs
FITs are common incentives for RE producers in situations where the self-generation cost
is above grid parity. They are regarded as the main instruments that are combined with
other, secondary instruments, like purchase obligations. FIT is the price that RE producers
receive for each kWh they sell to the grid. It is higher than the wholesale price but the
level depends between countries. Many design elements are particular to FITs and can be
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used  to  achieve  different  targets.  For  example,  the  policy  can  impose  or  induce  to  use
local components or installers (Mir-Artigues & del Río, 2016). In general, the most com-
mon design questions are:
∂ Which price the FIT is tied to and is it revisioned periodically?
∂ Does different plant capacities, locations or installation styles have different sup-
port levels?
∂ Are there limits on capacities that are eligible for the scheme?
∂ Is there a cap and/or a floor in the FIT that can not be overtaken?
∂ What is the eligibility period of the FIT? (Couture et al. 2010; Mir-Artigues & del
Río, 2016)
Advantages of FITs include security for the investor, low transaction costs, performance-
based costs and adjustability in the initial phase. They support technologies different
stages of maturity. They incentivise to maximise the production when there is no cap on
production. In addition, they do not reduce the amount of taxes and network charges car-
ried from energy bills. Seen disadvantages include market distortion, cross subsidising
effect and weak controllability if badly designed. By themselves, they do not solve the
issue of high upfront costs. They also require continuous and long-term policy commit-
ment. They do not encourage competition between project developers and create reliance
on policy. (Couture et al. 2010, pp.11-12) In addition, FIT are not compatible with stor-
ages as they guarantee the same price for selling electricity at all times (Schill et al., 2017).
The main challenge in the policy design is to set and maintain a support level that is not
too costly but still effective in encouraging new investments. Too high FITs have also
brought speculative players in the market who are there only to rip off the subsidies and
not planning to stay and develop the field. (Mir-Artigues & del Río, 2016) Decreasing the
levels has had a big impact on the market. In Germany, for example, even the possibility
of decreasing the FIT seems to have an effect. This dynamism was seen in 2012 due to a
FIT system that looks at monthly PV capacity increases and then may decrease the FIT
by 0,5%. The level of the compensation became closer to the wholesale price than the
retail price, which explains the overall decreasing trend of installations (Tews et al.,
2016).
The implementation of the FIT depends on the country. Utility’s role in the implementa-
tion can be increased with purchase obligation that requires them to purchase the produc-
tion of eligible installations. The financing of the FIT programs is buried to consumers,
either through tax budget or a levy included in the electricity price. For example, Germany
and Denmark include the support costs in the electricity price. Spain has had a hybrid of
these methods. Other options are financing through carbon auction revenues or utility tax
credits. (Couture et al., 2010, p. ix) Including FIT to the retail price increases consumer
prices sometimes remarkably. It encourages energy efficiency and SC but it also buries
costs on often more vulnerable consumers. High electricity prices also encourage using
77
fossil fuels for heating and transportation. In that way, also their use as flexibility assets
will be lower and so the whole ecosystem misses potential flexibility sources.
Net metering and billing
Shift to self-consumption has brought net metering and net billing as more popular ways
of incentivising RE production. However, these terms include many different variations
and meanings. In net metering scheme the kilowatt-hours injected to the grid are valued
the same the electricity consumed from the grid, namely as retail price. In practice, the
meter turns backwards when there is electricity fed in to the grid. If only one register is
used, the actual production and consumption amounts remain unknown. (Hughes & Bell,
2006) The billing period is an important design element in this policy. Oftentimes the
period is 2-3 months but in Denmark, for example, it is one hour. Shorter the period is,
more it encourages to use own production. Longer the period between meter readings is,
more there will be flexibility for the prosumer and in a way more subsidy given by the
system. (BEUC, 2016) Some countries use metering period of one year, which does not
incentivise to demand side response at all. The advantage of the net metering policy is its
simplicity for the consumer due to a simple billing arrangement.
The Danish net metering model is close to the net billing system in the way that it incen-
tivises bigger SC rates. In net billing, the electricity fed to the grid is most often valued
as the wholesale price so the compensation for excess production is often just some cents
per kilowatt-hour. In practice, prosumer net billing measures difference between the value
of consumption and production. If the remuneration is done on the real-time wholesale
price, the length of the billing period does not matter.
Remuneration instruments are usually adjusted to certain technologies because they have
different cost and production structures. Technology neutral models like green certificates
are also used in some countries but there is a general shift towards SC models. In princi-
ple, remuneration policies are financial instruments that affect the profitability of DR and
energy storing. They also affect the amount of network tariffs and taxes paid. Net billing
incentivises to increase self-consumption as much as possible if the remuneration is below
retail price. Net metering incentivises to install as much capacity as possible if the excess
production is remunerated but it does not incentivise DR. Dynamic pricing and ToU tar-
iffs can further strengthen this effect since the wholesale price goes down when sun is
shining and all PV systems get to their full production. According to Masson et al. (2014)
it remains unclear whether time-based pricing is good for prosumers or not. Renewables
decrease the market prices when they are widely deployed. On the other hand, dynamic
pricing with large amounts of PV production leads to higher demand side response and
use of storages.
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Approach of the European Union
In principle, EU states are not allowed to support certain technologies from state funds in
a way that distorts domestic and international markets. If the aid is governed by somebody
else than state, they are, however, possible. (KPMG, 2014) State aid guidelines calls for
shift to auction-based systems but systems under 500 kW are exempted of these measures
and may still be part of a FIT or premium system (European Commission, 2014b). Net
metering is not directly mentioned but regulators are against it (ACER & CEER, 2017) .
Table 18. Direct production compensation in case countries.
FIT / FIP Net metering/billing Source
IT PPAs. Sales decreased after “Conto Energia” was
phased out in 2014.
‘Scambio sul posto’ net billing
scheme is applicable for plant
sizes of 20-200kW. Yearly
netting period. ToU price.
(Castello, S., Tilli,
F., Guastella, 2015;
European
Commission, 2015;
RES Legal, 2017)
FI PPAs. N/A (Ahola, 2015;
European
Commission, 2015)
DE <90% of production applicable for FIT. Level de-
pends on site and capacity, approximately 10
€ct/kWh. Rest PPA or spot market price (4-5
€ct/kWh).
N/A (RES Legal, 2017)
FR Integrated installations have almost double FITs,
approximately 23 €ct/kWh. Others have about 13
€ct/kWh.
N/A (CRE, 2017)
CH Revenues from excess PV electricity injected to grid
approximately 15 €ct/kWh. Long waiting list for the
FIT and with only 100 MW of new contracts (2015).
Big differences between cantons.
Some utilities. (Hüsser, 2016; RES
Legal, 2017)
4.4 Phase 5: Confirmation
4.4.1 Aggregation
Demand response can be divided into two categories, explicit and implicit DR. Implicit
DR, sometimes called “price-based DR”, means that customer chooses a time-variant
electricity pricing and acts according to that (SEDC 2015). In explicit DR, households’
loads are aggregated and their resources are traded in the wholesale, balancing and ca-
pacity markets. In practice, it means that some consumer appliances are controlled
through home energy management systems or smart meters. Consumers can receive pay-
ments if they act upon aggregator’s request.
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The types of aggregators in the residential market segment are demand aggregator and
generation aggregator. Demand aggregator controls different devices like water boilers,
smart thermostats and air conditioners. Their availability and maximum temporal powers
are relatively low but heat pumps combined with boilers are suitable for longer services
like peak shaving (Eid, et al., 2016). Demand aggregator can use bi-directional DERs like
batteries and EVs with smart charging. This brings along many optimisation problems
related to charging costs, rewards and incentives on supply and demand shifts and patterns
on usage and loading. Generation aggregator controls different distributed generation
units like prosumers’ solar PV production combined to smart inverters. (Ikäheimo et al.
2010) V2G solutions and batteries offer flexibility with bi-directional devices. Batteries
offer availability and work instantaneously when wanted. (Plancke et al. 2015)
Rationales of DR programs are reduction in total power consumption and generation by
decreasing the need for peak demand supply. Adding flexibility to the grid decreases the
need of capacity mechanisms. DERs have a short start-up time, which enables quick re-
sponse and a robust output for example, when a bigger production unit breaks down. In
addition, aggregators bring actors together and offer value by overcoming information
barriers, reducing transaction costs and coordination of market participants. (Pérez-
Arriaga et al. 2016)  It empowers consumers to energy efficiency, brings new players to
the market and helps to integrate more RES to the system. Retailers who engage in the
aggregation market do so because low wholesale market prices have lowered the value of
their generation portfolio and pushes them to explore new business opportunities. Owning
inflexible generation like wind or nuclear energy increases balancing costs but do not
provide the retailer to gain from high market prices. Also new independent entrants form
a threat to retailers but on the other hand create also market and consumer awareness.
(SGTF, 2015)
The disadvantage is that if badly implemented, a synchronised DR may actually increase
the pressure in the grid when many consumers react to price fluctuations on the same
time. The geographical distribution of DERs may not be favourable from the system’s
perspective (Schill et al., 2017). In addition, central and local balancing will eat each
other’s business. (Schill et al., 2017; SEDC, 2016) Suppliers have also criticised inde-
pendent aggregation for reducing their revenues and taking responsibility of imbalance
they create (DNV-GL, 2017). Societal barriers in making aggregation possible in the res-
idential loads is related to consumer preferences and privacy concerns. People do not
often like that they lose control of their  devices and possibility of surveillance of their
actions. In the EV segment challenges of aggregation are related to charging sequences,
duration and rates (Carreiro et al., 2017). For the business developers the high upfront
costs, risk of failure and decrease in known revenues form barriers of entrance for retailers
to step in the aggregation market. Efficient aggregation requires economies-of-scale on
the residential level to influence the supply level. The sums are small when all participants
divide them. For example, in the US customers received 33$ savings per year but enabled
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to avoid 140 megawatts of generating capacity. (Pérez-Arriaga, et al. 2016) Swisscom
aggregator tiko has over 10000 customers in Switzerland. It offers approximately up to
250 euros per year savings if customer joins his/her storage in tiko’s virtual power plant
(Tiko, 2017).
The implementation network of explicit DR is complex and requires cooperation between
TSOs, DSOs, retailers, aggregators and end-users. Electricity supply must provide ancil-
lary services to the grid, which ensure that DSOs and TSO can maintain frequency sta-
bility and voltage control in the grid. DSOs normally determine the demand volume that
should be altered in a certain period. The aggregator gets this information and chooses
the end-users that agree with the proposed DR program. Then aggregator informs DSO
what capacity end-users are ready to provide for the market. (Carreiro et al. 2017)
Rules and market design
Many countries have still DR regulation that suits only large fossil fuel generation units
and big consumers like steel factories (Eid et al., 2016). Important attributes of the DERs
include direction of the load, size (kW and Kwh), time and location (see figure 21). The
flexibility markets where DERs can participate vary from short-term ancillary services
keeping grid stable to long-term capacity markets balancing big fluctuations in supply
and demand. The temporal characteristic can be defined by the maximum duration the
DER can sustain its maximum power. For example, a 10 kW battery and capacity of 50
kWh can sustain 5 hours at its peak capacity. The regulations on DR were designed ac-
cording to fossil-fuel generators and can remain up to 12-60 hours in some countries. If
the minimum bid to get into the market is for example 50 MW, it efficiently blocks resi-
dential loads from the DR market. (SEDC, 2017)
.
Figure 21. DER attributes for flexibility services (Eid et al., 2016).
DR including aggregated loads may be authorised offer in electricity markets but more
detailed regulatory framework is often needed to lower the legal barriers. The definition
of aggregator’s role in the market clears their tasks (Bertoldi et al. 2016). In advanced
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markets, the aggregators can act independently from utilities and in that way create a new
business unit in the electricity market. Obviously, the businesses of DR and electricity
selling are contradictory to each other and in that way may reduce the options to ones that
are favourable for the retailer. On the other hand, more regulation brings more adminis-
trative costs, which may be market barrier especially for smaller companies (NordREG,
2017).
The measurement, verification standards and compensation mechanisms should be suita-
ble for DR. One essential element is setting an expectation baseline, which tells how much
DR is produced compared to so-called normal consumption (SGTF, 2015, annex 5). Im-
portant product elements include communication protocols, transparency of methods how
DR is measured and penalties of non-compliance to agreements. Requirements should be
proportionate to customer capabilities, payments fair and penalties reasonable (SEDC,
2017). Experiments and demonstrations of aggregating business are valuable because
they help to find best practices on which a stronger legislation will be built and clear up
the way to technical standards that enable innovations.
Data management
Consumer data provision and access are key barriers for DR (Pause et  al.,  2016).  Data
exchange between aggregators, retailers and BRPs helps to control the actions of each
party. As the smart grid diffuses, the amount of information that comes from the grid use
increases dramatically. Eurelectric (2016) categorises the data into three main categories,
namely
1. Smart meter data
2. Smart grid data
3. Smart market data
Smart meter data includes consumer identification and his/her consumption and produc-
tion data. Consumer chooses who is allowed to use and process this data. Smart grid data
comes from smart meters, censors and others and is used for grid monitoring and includes
voltage, frequency and power quality data. The smart market data is the wide set of data
coming from other sources related to the grid, for example, smart appliances, EVs,
weather forecasts and price information.
From consumers point of view the change to earlier is remarkable because earlier the data
exchange did not really even exist except the billing and reading the aggregate consump-
tion. Current meters can give the information on the customer behaviour with high accu-
racies. Even though the meter does not necessarily show the use of appliances separately,
it is possible to analyse their usage patterns from the cumulative energy consumption
data. This kind of data is valuable also for third party actors like insurance companies.
Giving information requires mutual trust from consumers (Michaels & Parag, 2016).
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Regulations regarding smart meter and data ownerships are important innovation facili-
tators (Zhou & Brown, 2017). They allow innovative use of information for new business
models by democratising the information of the system (von Hippel, 2005). Data sharing
is a horizontal instrument that can be used for different technologies and business models,
like aggregation. Like the electricity value chain, also the data handling is changing from
bilateral exchange to open data. Some countries are moving towards centralised data hubs
where it is distributed to different players. Some countries are staying in decentralised
models where the DSOs, for example, are responsible for data management. The central-
ised model is efficient for new players in the market since it reduces transaction costs on
information exchange. However, centralised data management is also more vulnerable
against cyber-attacks than the decentralised model and takes several years to be imple-
mented. Defining the tasks and responsibilities of a neutral market player is essential
(SGTF, 2016, p. 13). Eurelectric (2016) sees there is no “one size fits all” solution but the
centralised data hub is “increasingly relevant to smarter energy systems”. National insti-
tutional differences seem to be so big that it is difficult to evaluate which model is the
best for prosumer ecosystem development.
Approach of the European Union
Regulation level concerning aggregation on the EU side has been low (Pause et al. 2016).
The Clean Energy Package aims to correct this and states that consumers should have fair
conditions with aggregators and a possibility to get contracts with aggregators without
acceptation of the customer’s supplier. It requests member states to define frameworks
for independent aggregators and handling DR as a resource like all others in the energy
markets.  Article 4 states that small RE plants do not have balancing responsibilities but
shall have access to balancing markets. Article 7 states that the minimum bid size should
1 MW. (European Commission, 2017b)  These issues are already noticed in the Energy
Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU), where the EU member states are required to achieve
20% energy efficiency gains at all levels of the energy value chain. In addition, the di-
rective says that network regulation and tariffs should not prevent network operators or
retailers to make DR services available. The directive on the internal energy market
2009/72/EC (European Union, 2009) says that TSOs should facilitate end-user and ag-
gregator participation in reserve and balancing markets.
The EU General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679/EC (European Union, 2016) sets
overall requirements for consumer data and its movement. It addresses tasks of data sub-
ject, controller, processor, recipient of data, data protection officer and supervisory au-
thority. For example, consumers have the right to access and control his/her data from the
third parties that are using it. In addition, they have to be asked for a permission to use
the data and inform of any data collection and usage beforehand. Regulation has to be in
place in the member states by 25th of May 2018.
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Table 19. Aggregation regulation in case countries.
Aggregation regulation SEDC
grade
(2017)
Data management Source
IT No framework for aggregated DR in
place. Changes ongoing.
3/20 Centralised data platform for all
participants.  DSOs are responsible
for metering process.
(SEDC, 2017;
Bertoldi et al
2016; SGTF,
2016)
FI DR and aggregation possible but exists
mainly in large scale due to minimum bid
size. Aggregators service providers to re-
tailers.
14/20 Centralised data platform for all
participants. Customers control
their authorisations by using Data
hub services via their utility’s web
pages.
(Bertoldi et al
2016; SEDC,
2017; SGTF,
2015; SGTF,
2016)
DE Aggregation via retailers only. Residen-
tial sector not active yet but industry and
commercial yes. Discussions on opening
secondary and tertiary reserves to DR.
10/20 Customer data will be stored in
each smart meter device. Custom-
ers’ access to their data is planned
to be available during 2017.
(SEDC, 2017;
SGTF, 2015;
SGTF, 2016)
FR Balancing mechanisms, ancillary ser-
vices and capacity mechanisms open to
aggregated DR. Independent aggregation
enabled. Changes done in 2016.
18/20 DSOs are responsible for data pro-
tection and must ensure customers
access to their data. Processes be-
tween customer, DSO and third
parties of DSOs and third parties
not yet solved.
(Bertoldi, et al.
2016; SEDC,
2017; SGTF,
2015; SGTF,
2016)
CH Balancing service providers are allowed
to aggregate loads without permission of
BPR. No tariff incentives.
16/20 No info (SEDC, 2017)
4.4.2 Energy storage
Energy storage enables further integration of RES, balances the system and provides se-
curity of supply. It also decreases energy prices and their volatility. In addition, prosumers
can offer ancillary services via an aggregator and shave peak demand by arbitraging,
namely feeding electricity in to the grid when the prices are high and storing when it is
cheap. (RMI, 2015) In low-voltage grid areas, they can also provide back-up power in
case of a blackout. (EuroBAT, 2016; Ugarte et al., 2015)
On the residential level, “behind the meter” batteries can increase the self-consumption
rates from 30% up to 60-70%. The ultimate solution in sunnier areas is to add sufficient
capacity and to go off-grid totally. However, increasing self-consumption rates from 65%,
the cost per kWh increases quite rapidly because the system has to sustain longer periods
of no sun (Schill et al., 2017, p.149).
The market of in-home batteries is still relatively small, but the growth in certain countries
like Germany is significant. Reductions in battery costs continue and second-life use of
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EV batteries may reduce the prices further (Schill et al., 2017). Several regulatory changes
are needed to make energy storage sustainably profitable and market-ready. On the gen-
eral level comprising all storage methods, the key barriers to batteries’ participation in
the energy market are lack of a clear definition of energy storage, ownership of batteries
by DSOs and TSOs, double grid fees and taxes for stored electricity, financial compen-
sation for curtailed energy, lack of compensation for ancillary services and the lack of
dynamic pricing. (EuroBAT, 2016; Ugarte et al., 2015)
Other DER-related regulation and general ratemaking influence the profitability of stor-
ing. Incentive for owning a battery at home depends on the retail price of electricity. Clear
difference between self-produced cost and retail price can induce to invest in storage and
in that way to optimise further own energy usage. Net metering does not incentivise bat-
tery ownership because the monetary value of self-consumption remains same at all times.
Same thing applies with high FIT levels. Energy-based tariff systems favour the use of
storage for minimising the use of the grid but not that much for providing flexibility.
Capacity-based tariffs would incentivise storage purchasing, because lower peak demand
would reduce the network tariff. This would lead to usage of storage connected to big
loads likes EV charging. On the other hand, smaller network capacities limit bidirectional
DR.  (Ugarte et al., 2015) Priority dispatch may be a bottleneck for storage since it allows
feeding the RE to the grid always.
In total, incentivising residential energy storage is a matter of market design and incen-
tives and it involves practically all players in the market. The role of DSOs is still unclear,
because unbundling requirements prevent them from owning storages. On the market de-
sign level, they will be in charge of the network costs, which is also matter of govern-
mental decisions. Taxation of storages is currently not taken into account besides pumped
hydro, which leads to double taxation. In some cased the government offers subsidies and
low interest loans for the investment and this is done by the energy ministries and relevant
banks, like in Germany. Subsidies can be connected to certain demands. For example in
Germany, the SC rate has to be over 50 % (Schill et al., 2017).
Approach of the European Union
EU Battery Directive 2006/66/EC aim in minimising batteries’ environmental damages
by restricting the use of certain materials, such as mercury and setting framework for
recycling. Batteries are also related to EU Waste Legislation, Water Framework Directive
and RED. (European Commission, 2009) The new Clean Energy Package highlights dy-
namic pricing and that storages should have same possibilities to participate and to be
rewarded than other flexibility services like DR and flexible generation. According to it,
national frameworks should incentivise DSOs to procure especially DER-based services
to  support  the  system  but  they  are  not  usually  allowed  to  won  them.  (European
Commission, 2017b). Batteries were not even mentioned in the earlier Electricity Di-
rective from 2009. (European Union, 2009)
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Table 20. Battery incentives in case countries.
Battery incentive Source
IT 50% tax reduction (Mayr, 2016)
FI No specific incentives for battery storages. (Ahola, 2015)
DE KfW bank provides low interest loans for batteries up to 2000 €/kW. Re-
bates for under 30 kWp systems of up to 25% of costs. Market size 128
MWh in 2016. Condition of feeding max 50% of installation’s capacity to
the grid.
(RES Legal, 2017;
Schill et al., 2017;
Tews et al., 2016)
FR No incentives. Just a couple hundred batteries declared. (de l’Elpine, 2017)
CH In some cantons. (Hüsser, 2016)
4.4.3 Electric vehicles
Mobility is important part of the whole energy system and decarbonising traffic and re-
ducing its air pollution are remain big challenges. EVs are complementary products for
DERs because of their batteries, which have potential to offer flexibility to the system.
According to some studies, cars are parked almost 95% of the time, for which they could
be used for flexibility services to the grid. V2G and vehicle-to-home solutions are being
designed in order to use car batteries to smoothen peak demand, reducing electricity cost
and increasing reliability of the grid. (IEA-HEV, 2016)
Several policy instruments are used to fasten up the diffusion of EVs. Policies regarding
EVs can be divided into purchase incentives, use and circulation incentives and waivers
on access restrictions. Several countries offer incentives to buy an EV by offering so-
called registration subsidies, namely rebates or tax incentives. (Sierzchula et al. 2014) For
example, in Norway, which has been a frontrunner in EV adoption, these have included
tax exemptions from vehicle registration, ownership and VAT. In addition, there are di-
rect rebates and scrappage programs for changing old cars to newer ones. Circulation
subsidies are used regarding the use of the EV. In Norway, vehicle licence fees are lower
and EVs are exempted from road tolling, ferries and parking tickets in public parking
areas. Regulation can also offer other incentives, like in Norway’s case, faster routes by
offering bus lanes for EV cars. (Bjerkan et al. 2016) In addition, tailpipe emissions stand-
ards affect EV diffusion indirectly (IEA, 2016a).
Charging points are regarded as a prerequisite for larger diffusion of EVs. Public provi-
sion of charging points can help in the beginning of the diffusion. There are two types of
charging points: fast charging points, which are mostly situated in public areas like park-
ing lots and shopping centres and slow home chargers. A European wide standard (type
2) is used in home charging points, which works with lower capacities. The EU states that
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over 22 kW chargers are fast chargers and under 22 kW slow chargers. One charging
point costs approximately 1000e and costs of installation and cabling. Either the housing
company or the inhabitants pay charging points in apartments. Regardless of the organi-
sation, the metering has to be personalised. EVs are often leased by a company, which
then builds also a charging point for the customer. (Motiva Oy, 2017) The charging has
to be done smartly because of the power levels needed, which means there has to be real-
time communication and management.
EV diffusion is expected to follow Rogers’ model of the diffusion of innovations. Differ-
ent policy instruments suit different people, which can be taken into account when de-
signing the policy mix. Green et al. (2014) see that early adopters are less interested in
design and technological performance but rather on environmental performance and effi-
ciency. Bjerkan et al. (2016) did a study in Norway, in which they found that incentives
on fixed costs appealed men, older people, Tesla owners, and later adopters who mostly
live outside Oslo. Income is thought to be an important factor but also different results
are obtained (Li et al. 2017). This is taken into account in California, where high-income
families do not receive the EV rebate and charging stations have minimum targets for
deployment in low-income areas (Farrell, 2017).
The implementation of EV policies affects a network of players. Typically, dedicated
ministries implement the financial subsidies that are applied by private investors or com-
panies. There can be a new organisation initiated by the ministry for this purpose. (Tietge
et al. 2016) Cities implement and bear mostly the costs the new EV rules for traffic, like
toll payment exemptions, and parking spaces with the chargers (Milne, 2017). Car man-
ufacturers and utilities have to cooperate in the V2G business models and technology.
Suitable smart meters are provided by DSOs. Aggregation rules are part of the electricity
market regulation.
EV diffusion creates a need to accelerate the development of the smart grid and metering
infrastructure. As the diffusion continues, need for smart charging and DR increases,
which poses pressure on dynamic pricing, network tariffs and tax reforms. Depending on
the valuation of peak demand, EVs may incentivise the use of storage in the charging
stations. On the other hand, storage at home for EV charging would decrease the need of
V2G solutions.
Approach of the European Union
In the Alternative Fuel Directive, the EU sets a target for 800 000 public charging stations
in Europe by 2020. The Clean Energy Package included a proposal for EVs by requiring
a pre-cabling for every third public parking space. Focus of these targets are in urban
areas. Manufacturers have to comply mandatory CO2 emission targets and EVs get a
“super credit” in these calculations. From 2021 onwards, the average target is 95 g
CO2/km. EVs are treated as zero emitters. (EU, 2014)
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Table 21. Electric vehicle incentives in case countries.
EV incentives Charging infrastructure incentives Source
IT Exempt of ownership tax for first
5 years. After 5 years, 75% reduc-
tion compared to ICE cars. Many
regional incentives.
50 million € fund was dedicated in 2014; max
50% of costs could be covered with it. 2000 sta-
tions were in 2015 but Ministry of Transportation
planned to build 20000 more in 3 following years.
Enel has been active in V2G solutions.
(ACEA, 2017; IEA-
HEV, 2016)
FI  Minimum  rate  (5%)  of  the  CO2
based registration tax for EVs.
Government proposes now a sub-
sidy of 2000e.
4,8 million € public support by Ministry of Em-
ployment and the Economy. Earlier 35% rebates
for charging points.
(ACEA, 2017; LVM,
2017;
Sähköinenliikenne.fi,
2017)
DE 4000€ bonus for EVs. 3000€ for
PEVs. Exempt of ownership tax
for first 5 years. Exemption of
emission inspection, low-interest
loans.
Private-public partnership funding. E.g., Electro
Mobility Model Regions funding program has in-
vested 90 million of public and 80 million of pri-
vate money in charging stations. 16 550 slow
chargers and 1 403 fact chargers in 2016.
(ACEA, 2017; IEA,
2017; Tietge et al.
2016)
FR 6000€ for cars of 0-20 gCO2/km.
If replace old diesel car + 4000€
Private-public partnerships. 16 000 public charg-
ing points now, 100 000 in 2020.  50 million
funded by ADEME. Tax credit of 30 % of costs
for private people. Rebate of 50% of costs for
multi-housings.
(Ministère de
l’Environnement de
l’Énergie et de la
Mer, 2016, 2017)
CH  No  federal  policy  for  EVs.  Ex-
emption  of  car  import  tax.  Each
canton has their own policies.
E.g., Geneva exempts ownership
taxes for 3 first years.
Public-private partnerships. 3200 charging points
by the end of 2015.
(IEA-HEV, 2016)
4.5 Summary of country regulations
The results of the case country regulations and incentives are gathered in table 22. There
is used a three-level scaling that is similar for all studied policies. Regulations, financial
incentives and information policies are categorised in the following way on the same
scale. The meanings of the values are:
∂ * = No regulation in place. A financial punishment. Low emphasis on informa-
tional policies.
∂ ** = Regulation exists but the implementation still unclear. No incentives or only
small incentives in place. Standard implementation of informational policies.
∂ *** = Regulation well implemented. Incentives in place. Strong emphasis on in-
formational policies.
The table should be read as an overview of policies and not an explicit evaluation of them.
The effect on prosumer’s technology adoption of building codes and labels is, for exam-
ple, difficult to evaluate because the same policy may benefit one but restrict another
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company or consumer. In addition, the effect of standardisation, system size limitations
and bureaucracy is different for different companies. In general, less bureaucracy require-
ments is better for smaller companies but may be beneficial for larger and exporting com-
panies.
The knowledge phase is relatively well in place in Italy. Italy has had smart meters for
nearly 20 years now. Due to high price of electricity and southern location, Italy has good
conditions for residential solar PV. Market liberalisation has been done even tough con-
sumer prices are still partly regulated. Consumer incentivising in the persuasion phase is
less strong. Investment subsidies and third party ownership regulation are done on the
regional level and some incentives exist. The implementation is done relatively easy for
the customer. Italy is still subsidising residential solar PV production but the level of
subsidisation has come down significantly since the beginning of 2010s. For the high
price  of  energy,  it  is  a  prominent  market  for  batteries,  which  are  also  subsidised.  The
framework for aggregation is currently being under discussion and implementation, but
Italy is somewhat a latecomer in DR. In overall, opening the aggregation regulation can
create dynamic innovation ecosystem where all technologies are included.
In France, the market is still very centralised even though the market is legally liberalised.
Diffusion of prosuming is hindered by low electricity prices that are still regulated. Smart
metering is only now being rolled out. The persuasion phase has strong emphasis in
France as certificates have a big role, solar PV gets investment subsidies and building
permits are easy to gain. Currently, also the purchasing procedure is stable but lately it
also included many delays (Barth et al., 2014, p. 8). PV systems can earn FIT but also
self-consumption is now possible. France is investing in EVs through governmental sub-
sidies. It is also one of the frontrunners in aggregation and DR. The emphasis has been in
industrial side but now also consumers are getting involved. However, it does not subsi-
dise residential batteries, which have bad profitability due to cheap electricity. The cen-
tralised nature of the energy market and price regulation hinders innovation ecosystem
creation. The keystone player EDF is in controlling position regarding standards and com-
plements. The situation may change if the regulated consumer prices in France end. Na-
tional car manufacturers like Renault are investing in smart grids and aggregation.
In Germany, the market liberalisation is implemented even though the “big four” utilities
have still large market share. Smartness of the grid is lagging behind since German chose
to rollout smart meters in a selective way. The persuasion phase directs consumers to
combine solar PV with batteries as the rebate has this condition. In addition, many certif-
icates and building codes steer the market players. Germany has shifted from the incen-
tives that supported business logic of FITs to self-consumption, which is relatively prof-
itable for the consumer. On the other hand, high electricity prices hinder the overall elec-
trification of the energy system and create pressure to change the rate structure of network
tariffs and levies. Besides the relatively low FIT, consumers have still stable regulatory
framework for investing in own production. The regulatory framework for residential DR
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is only partly opened but players like Sonnen are frontrunners in that market. Currently,
EVs are getting relatively strong support from the government, which was not earlier the
case. Germany’s FIT support led to high and widespread competence in the solar industry
(Strupeit & Palm, 2016, p. 130). The structure of the market for DR and EVs may be
different to local and installer-lead solar PV market, as they require more digitalisation,
synchronisation and economies-of-scale. In addition, car manufacturers’ are big organi-
sations with long supply chains, which means they are not as agile as small RE compa-
nies.
Finland has implemented the European directives concerning market liberalisation and
smart metering. The market conditions support also dynamic pricing and connecting own
production to the grid. Finland has never subsidised residential solar PV except tax re-
ductions on the installation work. Due to long winters and low electricity prices, the res-
idential self-consumption or storing are not profitable. EVs do not get big subsidies in
Finland, but some schemes are being planned. In overall, the approach is to support level-
playing field by opening the regulation for different technologies. Even though the mar-
kets are not so big in Finland, this enables smart grid solutions to arise and spread in
export markets. System wide electrification is encouraged, which can be indicated from
the popularity of heat pumps, for example (Heiskanen & Matschoss, 2017, p. 2).
In Switzerland, the electricity market reform is still under way but opening will be imple-
mented in coming years for residential consumers, too. Smart meter rollout is lagging
behind in most cantons. Investment in solar PV is subsidised and conditions are also oth-
erwise in place. RE production is given a FIT but self-consumption model is more rele-
vant because of a long queue for the FIT. The regulatory framework for DR is one of the
most advanced in Europe and there are also some residential markets in place (Tiko,
2017). Batteries or EVs are not subsidised on the federal level but some cantons support
them. Due to fragmented governance of the subsidy policies, it is hard to get a coherent
picture of the Swiss prosumer ecosystem. However, federal subsidies for own RE invest-
ments and good regulatory conditions for DR have created a good backbone for EV dif-
fusion. Prosumers have had their say in the development, as many utilities are municipal-
ity-owned and politically steered. The decision of reducing nuclear power and declining
hydro energy will accelerate the prosumer ecosystem development.
No case country is supporting energy prosumer ecosystem in all dimensions. Germany is
supporting own production, batteries and EVs but lagging behind in smart metering and
DR regulation. France is a frontrunner in DR and EVs and supportive in own production
but has not yet implemented smart meter rollout or battery subsidisation. Italy has history
of supporting energy efficiency, PV production and smart meters but is opening its DR
markets only now. Finland has stable and open electricity market with smart metering
infrastructure in place but is not particularly pushing towards own production or in-home
batteries. Switzerland is one of the leaders in DR and own production even tough smart
meter rollout is not done and the market liberalisation is also underway.
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Table 22. Summary and brief evaluation of case country policies.
Policy Italy France Germany Finland Switzerland
Aw
ar
e-
ne
ss
Market liberalisation Yes *** Yes but not effective * Yes *** Yes *** Ongoing **
Smart meter rollout Yes *** Rollout began 2016 ** Selective rollout * Yes *** Only some cantons *
Pe
rs
ua
sio
n
Investment aid Some regional grants,reduced VAT **
Small grants and VAT
reduction ***
Grants if DSM/
storage connected ***
Some tax
reductions ** Grants ***
TPO allowance Allowed with condi-tions **
Some but uncertain
framework **
Available but not
common **
Available but not
common **
Available but not com-
mon **
Building codes Permission local activ-ity; RE requirements **
No permission need;
RE requirements *** No permission need ** No permission need **
No permission need;
RE requirements **
Labels and certificates For installers ** Very common *** Very common *** Voluntary based * No info
Im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n
Interconnection process Priority access *** Access procedureregulated ** Priority access ***
Hassle free but DSO
dependent **
Access procedure
regulated. **
Interconnection fees No fees *** Connection fee * No fees *** Possible connectionfee **
Possible connection
fee **
Self-consumption Possible *** Possible *** Possible *** Possible *** Possible ***
Collective self-consump-
tion
Scheme available but
not common **
Legal framework
sketched **
Direct deliveries
allowed ** Under discussion * Under discussion *
Taxes and levies Surcharge if > 20 kW ** No ** Surcharge if > 10kW ** No ** No **
Network tariffs Capacity fee increasing.Small fee on SC **
Mostly volumetric.
No costs on SC ***
Mostly volumetric.
No costs on SC ***
Division negotiable.
No costs on SC ***
Mostly volumetric. No
costs on SC ***
Compensation of excess
energy PPAs *
Moderate FIT, higher
for BIPV ** Low FIT * PPAs * Moderate FIT **
Co
nf
irm
at
io
n Aggregation
Framework being
created *
Well regulated DR
market ***
Partly opened DR
market **
Mostly opened DR
market **
Well regulated DR
market ***
Electric Vehicles Tax benefits ** Strong rebates andtax benefits ***
Rebates and tax
benefits *** Some tax benefits ** Some tax benefits **
Batteries Tax reductions *** No * Investment subsi-dies *** No *
Subsidies in some can-
tons **
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The support is now moving from technology-specific financial support towards creating
regulatory frameworks for different kinds of solutions. When thinking of general condi-
tion building, there is no one-size-fits-all type of solution. Roughly said, whatever poli-
cies are introduced, there are winners and losers. Different effects on DERs are summa-
rised in table 23. For example, incentivising lowering peak demand would mean capacity
payments. However, this is not in line with the target having flexible demand with effi-
cient DR and added infrastructure for EVs.
Table 23. Horizontal policies’ effect on DERs. “+”=positive,”–“=negative, “+/-“ pos-
itive or negative, “N”=neutral (extended from Honkapuro et al., 2017).
Network tariffs Taxes + levies
Smart me-
tering
Dynamic
pricing Volumetric
Capacity-
based Volumetric Progressive
Self-consumption +  +/- + +/- +  +/-
Demand Response + + N  +/-  N +
EVs
Uncontrolled + - + - + -
Smart charging + + N + N +
V2G + + N  +/- N +
Storage + + N  +/-  N +
Explanations of countries’ decisions can be derived also from their energy mixes. Italy’s
energy mix is highly dependent on gas, which is regarded as relatively flexible source of
energy.  France’s electricity comes mainly from nuclear energy, which is less capable to
respond to demand fluctuations. In Germany, the political decisions have supported resi-
dential prosumers the furthest, a decision made together with the phase out of nuclear
energy. Finland has a diverse energy portfolio but its energy production is connected to
its large steel and forest industries. Switzerland has decided recently to also phase out
nuclear power so it is increasingly dependent on imports.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Results
The objective of this thesis was to explore and structure the role of public policies in the
creation of energy prosumer ecosystems. The literature review handled different policy
approaches related to energy transition and theories of innovation adoption and ecosys-
tems. The context and the content of the study are shown in figure 22. To gain more
information in this context, following research questions were formulated:
RQ1: What policies contribute to energy prosumer ecosystem creation from
prosumer’s point of view?
RQ2: How European countries differ in adopting these policies?
These questions were answered by two phases of research. Firstly, a data collection
through different secondary data sources was conducted and different policies were struc-
tured as to different phases of energy prosumer journey. The policies emphasised solar
PV purchase process, which was seen as the cornerstone of the ecosystem. Secondly, a
cross-country comparison of selected policies was conducted from different secondary
sources. Selected case countries were Italy, Germany, Switzerland, France and Finland.
Figure 22. Research context structured into research areas.
Prosumer policy instruments were divided into five phases of the prosumer journey.
Firstly, smart meter rollout and market liberalisation are prerequisites or enablers for the
prosumer adoption. Secondly, policies that steer prosumer choices are investment aids,
third party ownership, building codes and standards, labels and certificates. They work in
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the persuasion phase and reduce the soft costs of the investment. The implementation
phase policies are grid connection procedure and costs, individual and collective self-
consumption regulation, network tariffs, taxes and compensation for the excess electricity
fed into the grid. The confirmation phase policies are regulation on aggregation, batteries
and EVs.
Results show that the case countries have adopted different policy mixes relative to en-
ergy prosumers. Italy has emphasised smart meter rollout even though its demand re-
sponse regulation is not established. It subsidises also batteries and has also good circum-
stances for storing and SC due to high electricity prices. France is a global frontrunner in
DR and incentivises EVs but is a follower in solar PV market due to low electricity prices
and relatively low FITs. For the same reason, also battery market is practically non-exist-
ing. Germany is closest of having incentivising policies in place for the whole ecosystem.
It has technology-specific financial incentives for EVs and batteries and grid parity for
solar PV because of high electricity prices. However, it is follower in smart meter adop-
tion and DR. Finland emphasises creating good market conditions by having smart me-
ters, well-functioning markets and regulation for DR. It has not adopted financial incen-
tives for any technology and the diffusion of DER is still low. Switzerland has emphasis
in solar PV and its DR regulation is one of the most advanced in Europe. However, it has
not rolled out smart meters and has no federal policies for EVs or batteries.
5.2 Contributions of the study
Theoretical contribution
This thesis brought together different policy approaches that relate to the energy transi-
tion. Although policy mixes have been widely researched, a comprehensive comparison
of policy fields and approaches has not been done. Earlier studies have done comparisons
between environmental and innovation policies (Jaffe et al., 2005; Popp et al., 2010;
Rogge & Rechardt, 2013) and transition and industrial policies (Alkemade et al., 2011).
It is useful to see which objectives and typologies can be used when creating a systemic
policy mix. These different typologies correspond well with the overall categorisation of
Groba and Breitschopf (2013, p. 17).
In earlier studies, the energy prosumer related policy instruments have mainly concen-
trated to technology specific approaches (e.g. IEA, 2014; Tews et al., 2016; Valles et al.,
2016). This thesis brought micro production, DR, batteries, EVs as well as energy effi-
ciency standards into the same study. This brings a more coherent picture of the innova-
tion ecosystem where these technologies are more and more interconnected. On the same
time, it contributed to the missing knowledge of policy mixes related to innovation system
development (Rogge and Rechardt, 2013, p. 35). It structured policy mix according to
consumer adoption process by combining Rogers’ technology adoption model. To au-
thor’s knowledge this has not been done before in the context of residential solar PV. This
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approach highlights linkages between different policies and actors from consumer’s point
of view. It  also adds a practical  point of view to TIS framework’s approach of system
relations.
Thesis also connects the common environmental policy typology of market-based poli-
cies, command-and-control policies and information policies into the innovation adoption
process (Borrás & Edquist, 2013). Even though the prosumer journey still miss validation,
this approach enables seeing, which policy types affect in which phases of the adoption
process.
Contribution for policymakers
For the policy makers, this thesis highlights the importance of systemic approach in the
policy mix design. The consumer perspective helps to add coherency by taking every step
of the process into account. Technology adoption is a process in which one weak part
may become a barrier even tough other polices in the process are effective. It offers in-
formation on the differences of political frameworks between the case countries. Alt-
hough the EU is harmonising the legislation, national differences remain big. Countries
have different business environments for DR, self-consumption, EVs and batteries.
Countries should find a policy mix that would incentivise prosuming, storing and electri-
fying transport and heating. Energy transition to clean technologies happens on many
frontiers and technologies are increasingly interconnected. As the prices of energy stor-
age, solar PV and EVs are coming down fast, implementing financial incentives for them
is challenging. Earlier mistakes of windfall profits to investors from solar and wind in-
dustries increase policymakers’ carefulness. Alongside technology-specific incentives,
creating market conditions for aggregators’ business models is increasingly important and
timely. Updating value propositions for DSOs, BRPs and generators so that they support
the development is essential at this point. The business ecosystem benefit from healthy
and striving partners. Data ownership and framework of smart metering are big questions
of the future where the EU has an increasingly important role. It also determines the future
of ecosystems if aggregators become the value dominators in the ecosystem.
As noticed earlier, no country has adopted a policy mix that would have strong and in-
centivising policies in place for each step. From ecosystem’s perspective, this would be
desirable. On the other hand, different pathways for the prosumer ecosystem are logical
because they derive from countries’ socio-technical system and these have to be taken
into account in policymaking. Missing policy intervention is not necessarily a barrier for
the  innovation  system development,  like  in  the  case  of  missing  smart  meter  rollout  in
Switzerland and Germany. In addition, some technologies, like DR and batteries, have
similar functions, so supporting both may not be efficient. Finally, it must be indicated
that policy recommendations require research on the effectiveness of the policies in cre-
ating the ecosystems.
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Technology solutions where countries seem to be furthest from supportive regulations
that would enable dominant designs are third party ownership models and collective SC.
These business models have a lot of potential for further RE diffusion in democratic way.
These businesses are perhaps more scalable than house segment as apartments are some-
what similar everywhere. On the other hand, new technologies like blockchain, may still
affect radically the development of these business models.
Other practical contribution
For information search, this thesis lists many information channels that are also regularly
updated. It lists interest groups, international organisations and other sources that concen-
trate in different regulations.
Table 24. Contributions of the study.
Theory Policy Business and other
Macro
-Policy approach comparison -Cross-country policy compari-
son with strengths and weak-
nesses.
-EU directives and proposals on
each policy topic
Meso
-Energy prosumer policy mix
structuration
-Policy areas to concentrate in
the future.
-Application of customer jour-
ney as a policy mix design tool
-Illustration of customer journey
applicable for company strategies
Micro
-Innovation adoption pro-
cess for energy prosumers.
-Customer processes and seg-
mentation as a part of policy
making
-Lists of information sources for
policy analysis
-Policy comparison for finding new
markets
For companies acting in the prosumer ecosystem, it gives a tool to analyse consumer’s
journey, which leads consumers into the ecosystem’s market. Different companies can
adapt the approach to their needs and ecosystem strategy. Different partnerships between
car manufacturers, solar companies, aggregators, utilities and smart home providers are
emerging. As the ecosystem positions have not yet been cleared out, companies have to
think their strategies and resources’ potential for them. The ecosystem theory from Iansiti
and Levien (2004) and Adner and Kapoor (2010) can work a basis for the ecosystem
strategy elaboration. Car manufacturers may figure the prosumer journey starting from
electric car adoption and aggregators from DR from consumers who are not willing to
invest in own microgeneration. These companies have to adopt knowledge of regulation
in other fields if they want to capture value stream outside their sector.
5.3 Assessment and limitations of the research
Most important limitations of qualitative studies are related to their reliability, construct
validity, internal validity and external validity (Yin, 1994). Yet, the roots of this division
are in quantitative research paradigm, and therefore it does not necessarily correspond
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well to qualitative studies. As the research question of this thesis was merely “what?”, it
takes a positivist approach to the topic. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the more
relevant criteria in positivist qualitative research are credibility, confirmability, dependa-
bility and transferability. This chapter aims to evaluate the reliability and validity of this
thesis within these terms.
Dependability
Dependability is a contextual way of evaluating the reliability of the study. Reliability is
typically used in positivistic quantitative studies to evaluate the repeatability of the re-
search. On the other hand, in case studies reliability issues arise from unstructured infor-
mation and researcher’s own interpretations (Bell & Bryman, 2015, p. 400). In this thesis,
no interviews were taken so the issue of interpretation is more related to researcher’s
choices in data collection. Healy and Perry (2000) propose criteria for the evaluation of
trustworthiness of the chosen methods in realism paradigm. Most notably, they refer to
ability to audit the research process. In this thesis the data sources for each country were
listed in the beginning. The general sequence of finding and using data was explained.
For repeating the same data collection in the future, it has to be taken into account that
not all reports and databases are updated or published annually and cannot therefore be
used in similar way. For instance, IEA’s prosumer-report and BEUC’s self-consumption
report are special reports published only once.
Confirmability
Confirmability evaluates how neutral the results are from the researcher. The results
should not reflect preferences of the researcher but the sources of information (Shenton,
2004, p. 72). This can be increased by triangulation and detailed description of the meth-
ods used. In the sense of confirmability, this means including the raw data, like notes or
statistics, data reductions, reconstructions and their processes in the study. Methodologi-
cal description may include two trails: one that describes the development of the theory
related to the research question and one that describes the how the data accumulated dur-
ing the research process (Shenton, 2004, p. 72).
In this thesis, the criteria of choosing the studied policies and countries is explained in the
methodology chapter. Describing the initial exploration of new policy papers and reports
explained why each policy was chosen. Search and use of data sources was explained and
language barriers mentioned.
In addition to researcher’s own decisions and interpretations, the objectivity of data
sources themselves has to be evaluated. As the data was mainly collected from secondary
sources that are tightly related to policy making there is a danger of following a path of
certain political agendas. Using many different sources reduce this risk. In addition, pa-
pers of SEDC and IEA, for example, have been widely cited in literature, which indicates
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they are rather reliable sources. Yet, also these organisations have some political agenda
behind them.
Credibility
Credibility refers to internal validity of the study. It shows how well the chosen method
suits measuring the abstract concept and research questions. Lincoln and Guba (1985)
state that credibility is the most important factor in ensuring trustworthiness of the study.
This thesis was conducted from secondary sources, so validity should be evaluated from
content validity and construct validity. In addition, criterion-related validity is relevant as
the policies were compared with each other.
The content validity measures how adequately and comprehensively the chosen measure
reflects the topic. To reach content validity, firstly, the entire domain of the research con-
text should be specified. Secondly, suitable measures ae selected. (Carmines & Woods,
2005) In this thesis, the theory was reviewed in a broad perspective with different policy
approaches and innovation ecosystems. The broad theoretical approach is justified know-
ing that energy prosumer policies are part of wide socio-technical change that happens in
different national contexts. Concentrating only in innovation and industrial policies
would have addressed the ecosystem creation as they share the similar policy targets.
Environmental and transitions policies, however, add other policy targets into the policy
mix.
The construct validity is based on the theoretical build-up of the study. It tells how well
the theory built is measured (Healy & Perry, 2000). It is especially important in cases
where the theory has not yet been established. Researcher merely formulates predictions
on the empirical indicators based on theoretical expectations. Problem exists if this theo-
retically driven prediction does not align with the actual phenomenon. (Carmines &
Woods, 2005) In this thesis, this issue can be connected to the use of Rogers’ innovation
adoption model to structure the policy mixes and innovation ecosystems. Clearly, it has
its strengths but also weaknesses. Strengths include simplicity, visibility and consumer
focus. The five steps of the process have been validated in earlier and in overall, the model
surely resembles prosumers adoption process. However, the separate activities and step-
wise structure where each step has to be overtaken for continuing to the next one do not
necessarily fit to the practice. On the contrary, France and Germany, for example, show
that smart meter rollout is not required for established micro production or DR. Studying
innovation ecosystem from the perspective of customer innovation adoption model can
be justified but is not necessarily fit for the purpose throughout. For example the TIS
model is a more comprehensive approach that looks at the connections also from the
companies’ perspective (Hekkert et al., 2007). However, the consumer perspective add
and interesting perspective in the ecosystem policy mix planning.
The criterion-related validity indicates how well the chosen criteria measures the actual
phenomenon (Carmines & Woods, 2005). Method of choosing the compared policies was
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explained in the methodology chapter. These indicators were based on the relevance and
availability of comparable data. These indicators could have been more systematically
evaluated from the innovation ecosystem functioning point of view. Now, the brief eval-
uation in table 22 shows merely the existence of the policy and does not evaluate its effect
on ecosystem’s success. However, the evaluation of policies is somewhat subjective even
if it is systematised to a certain criteria. Subsidies and incentives have dynamic effects
that are not only positive to the ecosystem creation. For example, subsidy-lead boom-
and-bust cycles have been very challenging for solar industry’s supply chains.
In general, the credibility of the research design could have been ensured with more in-
depth research on each country. This could have been done with interviews with national
experts like Imbert et al. (2017) did. The amount of countries would have been smaller
and in that way the research would have missed the larger picture of energy transition in
Europe. Another critique of the chosen research method is the short time scale that was
included. Energy is now a fast moving industry where also regulation changes rapidly.
For example, the reductions in FITs show how quickly policies can change in the RE
industry. Longer time-scale with only one or two countries would have enabled studying
contextual factors more in detail. That would have enabled answering to questions
“how?” and “why?”, instead, this thesis answers to question “what?”
Transferability
The external validity means the generalisability of the results to other contexts (Saunders
et al., 2009). In quantitative research approach, generalisability is improved with large
samples. In qualitative studies the criteria is different because the sample size is smaller
and context is more important. Transferability of the findings requires therefore similar
contexts in other countries. Lincoln and Guba (1985) state that making a “thick descrip-
tion” of the contextual factors increases the transferability of the study.
This thesis described the contexts on the macro level by describing countries’ energy
mixes, possible effect of industry, current energy policy agenda, RE targets, LCOE price
of solar PV and current PV diffusion. These aspects affect the prosumer policy mixes and
should be thought in other countries if similar investigations are to be done. However,
also contexts of each policy on the national level is important and this thesis did not ana-
lyse them. In principle, the context often determines the functionality of the policy. For
example, in Germany the important role KfW-bank is not comparable with other coun-
tries’ circumstances. Yet, the research method of cross-country comparison increases the
transferability of the research since it requires comparable and standardised data.
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5.4 Future research
The future research avenues this thesis forms can be structured in macro, meso and micro
levels. On the macro level, a more detailed study on policy strategies could aim answer-
ing, why countries pursue different policy strategies. For example, how disruptive change
the country is implementing and what strategies current regime actors have to take in the
transition. Policy landscape influencing would be another prominent way of studying pol-
icy strategies. According to Geels (2014), it is a topic under Transition Management that
requires more research. Regime resistance of incumbent utilities may form the policies
into more incremental approaches and in that way sustains their strategic positions in the
ecosystems. The ecosystem actors are creating political coalitions and, for example, dy-
namic pricing, energy poverty and data security are questions that divide the field to sup-
porters and opponents. Ecosystem members from transportation, energy and ICT fields
may participate in different coalitions. Furthermore, research on the regulatory interac-
tions between these fields would tell companies, which regulations they have to take into
account when entering the other industry.
On the meso level, a longitudinal study of the formation of national prosumer ecosystems
would be an interesting approach for studying networking between different fields. Reg-
ulations, like smart home labels for buildings, can be seen as drivers for these formations.
It should also be highlighted that the technologies also compete with each other. Relations
of policy mix and development of the prosumer ecosystem remains an interesting research
topic. This approach could combine different value layers Schleicher-Tappeser (2012)
described. Regulatory barriers and drivers for flexibility, like balancing responsibilities
and roles in different system levels affect other policies, too, but these dynamics have not
been researched yet.
This thesis built the prosumer journey, which was derived from utilities’ web sites where
similar journeys were presented. The prosumer journey should be validated and elabo-
rated through interviews. The usage phase should be an important part to research as con-
sumers’ activity finally determines the benefits of the technology to the system. For ex-
ample, the Use-diffusion model of Shih & Venkatesh (2004) could work as a frame of
customer engagement. Another way to continue is to study the effectiveness of the poli-
cies. This requires elaborating valid indicators that not only measure the diffusion of
DERs but also many other issues around them. For example, the DER integration costs
and grid development are issues to be taken into account.
New technologies’ like blockchain and V2G solutions will continue to change the eco-
system dynamics and affect the regulation. Research on new entrants should consider
socio-technical compatibility of the new technologies and the current regime. For exam-
ple, seasonal storage solutions and their fitting into the distributed energy regime will be
one of the questions to be answered in the future.
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